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Fully-automated parameterized verification of distributed systems, i.e., verification of systems instantiated
with an arbitrary number of processes, suffers from scalability challenges, even when it is decidable. This
paper seeks to push the boundaries of parameterized verification in the types of systems that can be verified
automatically as well as practically, by incorporating abstractions into the verification pipeline. We develop a
framework—QuickSilver—for modeling and automated parameterized reasoning about systems that build
on distributed agreement protocols, such as consensus or leader election.QuickSilver includes a modeling
language, Mercury, with primitives for abstracting distributed agreement, syntactic conditions for decidable
and practical parameterized verification of systems modeled inMercury, and an implementation that has
been demonstrably used for efficient, automated parameterized verification of several benchmarks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems are challenging to reason about—requiring an understanding of the interleaved
behavior of multiple independent processes that must globally perform some task. The challenge
of ensuring that distributed systems behave as expected has been tackled by the formal methods
community through the development of myriad approaches for specifying and verifying distributed
systems [3, 7, 16–18, 34, 40, 56, 61, 63, 67, 70].
A particular challenge for verification is parameterized verification—the problem of verifying
the correctness of systems that can be instantiated with an arbitrary number of processes. The
unbounded nature of the parameterized verification problem means that, in the most general case, it
is undecidable [27, 65]. As a result, researchers have investigated numerous approaches for tackling
the parameterized verification problem—restricting the class of systems that can be verified or the
types of specifications that can be proved correct [4, 6, 19, 24, 25, 31, 33, 37, 38], or, leveraging human
insight to fill in gaps that cannot be handled by automated approaches [16, 49, 55, 56, 63, 67, 70].
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One promising approach that has been pursued in recent years to reduce the verification burden
and improve the scalability of verification is to leverage the fact that systems builders reason about
and implement their systems using multiple layers of abstraction—messaging libraries, synchro-
nization primitives, distributed data structures, etc. Incorporating abstractions into the verification
process enables modular, component-based reasoning, breaking the verification challenge into
smaller, more manageable chunks. For example, Disel allows users to build programs out of verified
protocols such as two-phase commit [63]. An interactive theorem prover then allows users to
verify the correctness of programs composed of such protocols, separating the task of verifying the
composed program from that of verifying the underlying protocols.
In this work, we look at a different regime of parameterized verification: fully-automated pa-
rameterized verification without any user intervention. In contrast to approaches such as Disel
and Ivy [56, 63], which rely on human intervention to side-step undecidability, in this space the
primary means of avoiding undecidability is to restrict the classes of systems that can be veri-
fied [4, 6, 19, 24–26, 31, 33, 37, 38]. Even with such restrictions, fully-automated approaches often
cannot practically scale to systems that use complex coordination and communication mechanisms,
due to the combinatorial explosion of possible behaviors.
The key insight of this paper is that by incorporating abstractions into the verification pipeline,
we can push the boundaries of fully-automated parameterized verification both in the types of sys-
tems that can be verified and the types of systems that can be verified practically. In particular, this
paper develops a framework—QuickSilver—for modeling and automated parameterized reasoning
about systems that build on distributed agreement protocols, such as consensus or leader election.
Mercury: A Modeling Language with Agreement Primitives. Consensus and other distributed
agreement protocols present a challenge to automated parameterized verification because of the
intricate dance of messages that must be exchanged to satisfy the protocol requirements. These
messages lead to an explosion of interleavings that makes it difficult to scale up automated reasoning.
Section 3 presents a new modeling language, Mercury1, for distributed systems. This language
provides carefully-designed abstractions of agreement protocols that allow sophisticated applica-
tions to be built on top of agreement protocols. The agreement primitives inMercury are general
enough to subsume common agreement protocols such as consensus, 𝑘-set consensus, and leader
election, while providing intuitive semantics to enable their incorporation into larger programs.
Parameterized Verification of Mercury Systems. Section 4 then shows how we can perform
automated parameterized verification of systems modeled inMercury. We present two key results.
First, we show that parameterized verification of a broad class of Mercury systems is, indeed, de-
cidable. Note thatMercury’s agreement primitives enable this decidability result: by encapsulating
the complexity of agreement protocols in these primitives, we separate ourselves from the question
of decidability of verification of the underlying protocols.
Second, we show how parameterized verification can be made practical by providing cutoffs: a
number 𝑘 of processes such that verifying the correctness of a fixed-size 𝑘-process system implies
the correctness of arbitrary-sized systems. This result means that non-parameterized verification
engines can be leveraged to provide parameterized verification.
Section 5 instantiates the theoretical results of QuickSilver by presenting an implementation of
a cutoff-driven parameterized verification procedure forMercury systems. We show that several
complex applications, including a distributed pathfinding algorithm for mobile robots and the Small
Aircraft Transportation Aystem (SATS) protocol [64] can be naturally and succinctly captured in
1Modeling Event Reaction and Coordination Using symmetRY
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Mercury, and can then be efficiently verified.
Contributions. The key contributions of this paper are:
(1) A modeling language,Mercury, that provides primitives for distributed agreement, allowing
modeling of larger applications that build on agreement protocols.
(2) A decidability result for parameterized verification of a large class of systems expressible in
Mercury, including those that make use of its agreement primitives.
(3) Cutoff results that show that for many Mercury systems, there exists a small 𝑘 such that
their parameterized verification can be reduced to verification of a 𝑘-process system.
(4) An evaluation across several benchmarks written in Mercury showing that automated
parameterized verification is possible and practical.
2 QUICKSILVER OVERVIEW
Distributed Agreement Protocols. Distributed consensus protocols and, more broadly, distributed
agreement protocols enable a set of distributed participants, each proposing one value, to collectively
decide on a set of proposals in the presence of failures and asynchrony. Distributed agreement
is a necessary step for many functions in a distributed setting such as coordination, election,
atomic broadcasts, and ordering. There are many variants of agreement protocols with small
differences in their decision objectives. For instance, the participants may wish to decide on a single
proposal [43, 45, 50], a finite set of proposals [14], an infinite sequence of proposals [12, 53], or
even a finite set of leaders amongst themselves. Despite these variations, any correct agreement
protocol is characterized by the following three guarantees [48]: (i) agreement—all participants
decide on the same set of proposals, (ii) validity—every proposal in the decided set of proposals
must have been proposed by a participant, and (iii) termination—all participants eventually decide.
The ubiquity of agreement protocols in distributed systems has, quite naturally, triggered a
substantial amount of research in verifying that such protocols and/or their implementations
guarantee agreement, validity, and termination (or, some reasonable variant of these properties) [11,
15, 22, 23, 44, 47, 51, 55, 71].
2.1 Motivation
Recall from Section 1 that our primary objective in this paper is to provide fully-automated
parameterized verification of systems that build on distributed agreement. We note that this goal is
quite challenging: distributed agreement protocols are extremely sophisticated, and their complexity
can stymie attempts to fully automate their verification. Indeed, existing approaches for verifying
agreement protocols—on their own, let alone integrated into larger systems—have relied on human-
driven reasoning and deductive verification approaches [11, 15, 22, 23, 44, 47, 51, 55, 71]. Hence,
it seems like folly to attempt automated parameterized verification of systems that incorporate
distributed agreement.
Here, however, we draw inspiration from the layered, abstraction-driven approach adopted by
systems builders and some compositional verification approaches [5, 34, 63]: if we can cleanly
separate the functionality of agreement protocols from their design/implementation details, then
we can satisfy multiple goals at once. First, we can cordon off the hard-to-verify internals of
agreement protocols in black boxes whose correctness can be established by the aforementioned
verification approaches. Second, we can present clean interfaces to agreement protocols that
naturally lend themselves to building more complex systems. Hence, instead of attempting to
verify an application by including the internal details of any agreement protocols used, we can (1)
assume that the agreement protocols have been verified separately, and (2) replace the agreement
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protocols with primitives that are sound abstractions of correct agreement protocols. We argue that
there are interesting classes of agreement-based systems that permit fully-automated parameterized
verification once their agreement components are separately verified and suitably abstracted away.
We now present two illustrative examples of such agreement-based distributed systems. The
desired functionality of both example systems can be achieved by replacing their agreement
components with agreement primitives and can then be automatically verified for systems with an
arbitrary number of processes. We identify and present several more examples of agreement-based
systems in Sec. 5.
Both examples are presented in our modeling languageMercury—described in more detail in
Section 3. Briefly, in aMercury program, a process consists of a collection of variables, commu-
nication actions, and locations with associated event handlers. Each event handler consists of an
event and a reaction to that event. An event is an empty event, a receive of a communication
action, or one of the two agreement primitives: Partition and ValueCons. Reactions typically
consists of a block of update statements, control statements, and/or, sends of communication actions.
Illustrative Example: Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS). The goal of NASA’s SATS
protocol [64] is to increase access to small airports without control towers by allowing aircraft to
coordinate with each other to operate safely upon entering the airport airspace. For the landing
part of the protocol, the aircraft coordinate to choose successive subsets of aircraft to progress to
the next phase of landing, until just one aircraft is chosen to land at a time; thus, the protocol relies
on multiple rounds of distributed agreement, in particular, (multi-)leader election. To enable formal
verification, the landing protocol has been represented using both discrete [10, 52] and hybrid [39]
models. We focus on the discrete model where the position of an aircraft is modeled using discrete
locations (as opposed to real-valued coordinates).
In Fig. 1, we present a simplified version of the SATS landing protocol inMercury. An aircraft
starts in a Fly location and coordinates with other aircraft (Line 12) to pick at most four aircraft
to move to the Enter location where the aircraft enter the airport airspace; only four aircraft are
allowed in the airport airspace at a time to ensure there is enough room for any aircraft that misses
its final approach. Upon entering the aircraft airspace, the aircraft coordinate (Line 18) to pick at
most two aircraft to move to a left holding location, HoldLeft and at most two aircraft to move
to a right holding location, HoldRight; each holding location accommodates at most two aircraft
by having each aircraft circle at a different altitude while waiting. The aircraft in each holding
location coordinate to pick at most one aircraft eventually move to the Base location. From the
Base location, the aircraft coordinate to pick at most one aircraft to move to the FinalApproach
location where the aircraft can safely attempt to land by entering the Runway location. However,
due to unforeseen reasons (e.g., ice on the runway), the pilot may decide to abort landing. At that
point, the aircraft needs to head to one of the holding locations, HoldLeft or HoldRight.
The desired safety properties for the SATS landing protocol, provided by NASA, are as follows:
(1) there are a total of at most four aircraft across the locations Enter, HoldLeft, HoldRight, Base
and FinalApproach; (2) there are a total of at most two aircraft across the locations HoldLeft,
HoldRight, and Base; and (3) there is at most one aircraft in the FinalApproach location.
Notice that while the landing protocol uses multiple rounds of leader election (highlighted in
the code) to pick a set of aircraft to move to certain locations, its desired safety properties do not
refer to the internals of leader election. The safety properties can be reasoned about by assuming
the correctness of the leader election protocol(s) used and replacing leader election with a cor-
responding primitive, denoted in the code as Partition (we will expand on this later in this section).
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1 process SATS
2 variables
3 int[0, 1] direction
4 idset BaseS
5 actions
6 br ToBase : unit
7 br AllHere : unit
8 env
9 rz Miss : unit
10 rz Land : unit
11 initial location Fly
12 on Partition<pc1>(All,4)
13 win:
14 goto Enter
15 lose:
16 goto Idle
17 location Enter
18 on Partition<pc2>(pc1.winS,2)
19 win:
20 direction = 1
21 goto HoldLeft
22 lose:
23 direction = 0
24 goto HoldRight
25 location HoldLeft
26 on Partition<pc3>(pc2.loseS,1)
27 win:
28 goto Ask
29 lose:
30 goto HoldLeft
31 passive pc4, pc5, ToBase, AllHere
32 location HoldRight
33 on Partition<pc4>(pc2.loseS,1)
34 win:
35 goto Ask
36 lose:
37 goto HoldRight
38 passive pc3, pc5, ToBase, AllHere
39 location Ask
40 on _ do
41 sendbr(ToBase)
42 goto Base
43 on ToBase do
44 BaseS.add(ToBase.sID)
45 goto Base
46 location Base
47 on Partition<pc5>(BaseS,1)
48 win:
49 goto FinalApproach
50 lose:
51 goto Idle
52 on recv(AllHere) do
53 BaseS.add(AllHere.sID)
54 on _ do
55 BaseS.add(self)
56 sendbr(AllHere)
57 passive pc3, pc4, ToBase
58 location FinalApproach
59 on Miss do
60 if(direction == 1)
61 goto HoldLeft
62 else
63 goto HoldRight
64 on Land do
65 goto Runway
66 passive pc3, pc4, pc5,ToBase, AllHere
67 location Idle
68 passive pc2, pc3, pc4, pc5, ToBase,
AllHere
69 location Runway
70 passive pc3, pc4, pc5, ToBase, AllHere
Fig. 1. Process Definition: Landing Protocol of the Small Aircraft Transpotation System (SATS).
Illustrative Example: Distributed Key-Value Store. As another example of an agreement-based
distributed system, consider a distributed key-value store consisting of a group of replicated
processes with data. The desired functionality here is to present a consistent data model to clients
who may access the data from an arbitrary replica. One strategy to achieve this is to perform
consensus among the replicated processes whenever any of them receives a request to change the
stored data.
In Fig. 3, we model a simple key-value store in the spirit of Redis [60] inMercury. For ease of
presentation, we skip key indexing logic and present a single-key system. The system begins with
all processes in an Idle location. If a process receives a get request (Line 14) while in this location,
it transitions to the Ret location where it responds with its stored value. Upon receiving a put
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1 process KVStore
2 variables
3 int[0,2] local
4 int[0,2] stored
5 actions
6 env rz put : int[1,2]
7 env rz get : unit
8 env rz return : int[1,2]
9 initial location Idle
10 on ValueCons<vc>(All,1,local) do
11 stored = vc.decVar[1]
12 local = vc.decVar[1]
13 on recv(get) do
14 sendrz(return,stored,get.sID)
15 on recv(put) do
16 local = put.payld
17 if(stored != local)
18 goto Agree
19 location Agree
20 on ValueCons<vc>(All,1,local) do
21 stored = vc.decVar[1]
22 local = vc.decVar[1]
23 goto Idle
Fig. 2. Process Definition: Distributed Key-Value Store.
1 process KVStore
2 variables
3 int[0,2] local
4 int[0,2] stored
5 actions
6 env
7 rz put : int[1,2]
8 rz get : unit
9 rz return : int[1,2]
10 initial location Idle
11 on ValueCons<vc>(All,1,local) do
12 stored = vc.decVar[1]
13 local = vc.decVar[1]
14 on recv(get) do
15 goto Ret
16 on recv(put) do
17 local = put.payld
18 if(stored != local)
19 goto Agree
20 location Ret
21 on _ do
22 sendrz(return,stored,get.sID)
23 goto Idle
24 location Agree
25 on ValueCons<vc>(All,1,local) do
26 stored = vc.decVar[1]
27 local = vc.decVar[1]
28 goto Idle
Fig. 3. Process Definition: Distributed Key-Value Store.
request (Line 16) with some value, a process must determine its effect on the collective data model.
If the value is the same as the current stored value, no change is required and the process stays in
Idle. If the value differs from the stored value, the process moves to the Agree location to perform
consensus with the other processes; since multiple processes may have received a put message,
they all must agree on a single value to store.
The safety property for this system is that no two processes in Ret may have different values in
their stored variables; hence ensuring the clients have a consistent view of the data. Notice that
this example uses distributed agreement in the form of consensus to achieve its desired functionality.
The safety property does not refer to the internals of consensus and can be reasoned about by
assuming the correctness of the consensus protocol used and replacing it with a corresponding
primitive, denoted in the code as ValueCons (we will expand on this shortly).
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2.2 Key Ingredients
Agreement Primitives. The design of our agreement primitives is driven by our goal of fully-
automated, compositional, and parameterized verification of agreement-based systems. Thus, the
level of abstraction in our agreement primitives was carefully chosen to strike a balance between (a)
ensuring full-automation of parameterized verification and (b) capturing the essence of most practi-
cal agreement protocols without modeling protocol-specific behavior. To meet these objectives, we
propose two agreement primitives, Partition and ValueCons, that can individually model two
common variants of agreement that we refer to as partition-and-move agreement and value-store
agreement, respectively. The two primitives can further be composed together to model other
variants of agreement.
The Partition Primitive. The Partition agreement primitive is used to model partition-and-move
agreement, where a set of participants wish to partition themselves into groups. Instances of
partition-and-move agreement include variants of leader election protocols which partition the
participants into two groups: leaders (or, winners) and non-leaders (or, losers). Note that the value
proposed by each participant is essentially their process index (PID), which, in a parameterized
distributed system with an unbounded number of processes, is drawn from an infinite domain. To
enable automated parameterized verification of distributed systems that use partition-and-move
agreement protocols, the cardinality of exactly one group must be unbounded (e.g., non-leaders),
while that of all other groups must be finite (e.g., leaders). This disallows, for instance, partitioning
the participants into two equal sets of winners and losers. Fortunately, we observe that most
partition-and-move agreement protocols pick a finite number of winners that is independent of the
number of participants.
Each Partition agreement primitive has an identifier, and takes two parameters: the set of
participants and the desired number of winners. The winners (resp. losers) of a Partition primitive
with identifier part can be retrieved using the expression part.winS (resp. part.loseS). Finally, the
reaction of each Partition agreement primitive contains a win (resp. lose) handler that indicates
how the process behaves upon winning (resp. losing).
Example: SATS (Fig. 1). In this example, the variant of agreement used by a set of aircraft to pick a
subset amongst themselves to move to certain locations is partition-and-move. Hence, agreement
is modeled using the Partition agreement primitive as shown. For example, the Partition prim-
itive in Fig. 1, Line 12 with identifier pc1 aims to pick 4 aircraft out of the set of all aircraft (All).
The winners (resp. losers) of this agreement instance can be accessed by pc1.WinS (resp. pc1.LoseS).
The ValueCons Primitive. The ValueCons agreement primitive is used to model value-store agree-
ment, where a set of participants, each proposing one value, wishes to decide on (a set of) values.
Instances of value-store agreement include protocols such as Paxos [43], Fast Paxos [45], Flexible
Paxos [35], Mencius [50], and 𝑘-set agreement [14]. To enable automated parameterized verification
of distributed systems that use value-store agreement protocols, we restrict the domain of the
proposed values to be finite. We note that many distributed systems aim to solve coordination-like
problems rather than compute a function over their data. Hence, infinite concrete data domains
can soundly be treated as finite abstract data domains using, for example, predicate abstraction.
For instance, while the domain of the data in the example in Fig. 3 may be infinite, the semantics of
the protocol only requires knowing whether the value being put is equal to the stored value or not
(i.e., stored != local), and hence a finite domain of two distinct values is sufficient to explore all
the paths in the program.
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1 process MultiPaxosSnippet
2 variables
3 int[0,2] prop
4 int[0,2] commit
5 actions
6 env put : int[1,2]
7 initial location Start
8 on Partition<pc>(All,1)
9 win:
10 goto WaitForReq
11 lose:
12 goto Accept
13 location WaitForReq
14 on recv(put) do
15 prop = put.payld
16 goto Propose
17 location Propose
18 on ValueCons<vc>(All,1,prop) do
19 commit = vc.decVar[1]
20 goto WaitForReq
21 location Accept
22 on ValueCons<vc>(All,1,_) do
23 commit = vc.decVar[1]
Fig. 4. Partial Definition of a Process using Multi-Paxos.
Each ValueCons primitive has an identifier, and takes three parameters: the set of participants,
the number of proposals to be decided and (an optional) variable that a process uses to propose a
value. For a ValueCons primitive with identifier cons, the 𝑘 th decided value can be accessed using
the expression cons.decVar[𝑘].
Example: Distributed Key-Value Store (Fig. 3). In this example, the variant of agreement used to
decide which value should be stored when a process receives a put request is value-store. Hence,
agreement is modeled using the ValueCons agreement primitive with identifier vc as shown (lines
11 and 25). All processes participate and propose a value through the variable local. The primitive
aims to decide on one value that can be accessed using the expression vc.decVar[1].
Composition of Primitives. The Partition and ValueCons primitives can be composed to model
agreement protocols like Multi-Paxos [12] and Raft [53], where a set of participants wish to decide
on a potentially infinite sequence of values. Instead of invoking agreement on every value of the
sequence individually, such protocols enhance practicality by first electing a leader that proposes
the values, while the rest of the processes accept such values. Such protocols can be modeled by
using a Partition primitive to elect a leader, and then using ValueCons primitives to have the
leader propose values in subsequent rounds. Consider the partial process definition in Fig. 4. In
such a system, all processes start by using the Partition primitive to elect one proposer that
moves to the WaitForReq location and waits for requests, while all other processes move to the
Accept location, taking the role of acceptors. Upon receiving a put request, the proposer uses the
ValueCons primitive to agree with the acceptors. Note that the acceptors pass an empty proposal
(denoted _) as only the proposer should be proposing values.
System Model. Mercury enables modeling the behavior of a process in a system consisting of
one or more such identical processes that interact with one another and an environment. While
the agreement protocols encapsulated by the Partition and ValueCons primitives may use asyn-
chronous communication and tolerate failures, we impose some simplifying assumptions on the
system model outside of agreement. We assume that non-communicating processes can operate
asynchronously, but communication is synchronous (i.e., sending and receiving processes must
block until they can communicate). We further assume fault- and failure-freedom. These simpli-
fications enable pushing the boundaries of fully-automated parameterized reasoning. Moreover,
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we note that verification approaches like Verdi [70] similarly start with simple, failure-free system
models, and, verification of certain classes of asynchronous systems can be reduced to that of
corresponding synchronous systems [67].
Parameterized Verification. As mentioned in Sec. 1, the parameterized verification problem is a
well-known undecidable problem [27, 65]. Hence, it is not immediately obvious if parameterized
verification is even decidable for our target distributed systems with agreement primitives. To this
end, we present two main theoretical results that enable decidable and efficient parameterized
verification, respectively.
Decidable Parameterized Verification.We identify syntactic conditions, called phase-compatibility
conditions, on systems with agreement primitives that yield decidability of parameterized verifica-
tion. Informally, the phase-compatibility conditions capture systems that proceed in phases: each
process is always in the same phase as every other process and all processes, simultaneously, move
from one phase to the next using some global synchronization such as a synchronous broadcast
communication or agreement. The phase-compatibility conditions ensure that the system’s ability
to move between phases is independent of the number of processes. This independence paves the
way towards parameterized verification where the number of processes is arbitrary.
Example: SATS (Fig. 1). The SATS process shown is phase-compatible and hence enables decidable
parameterized verification. This system starts in a phase where all aircraft are in the Fly location.
Then, the system uses a Partition primitive to move to the second phase where all aircraft are in
locations Enter and Idle. Then, the system transitions to its third phase where all aircraft are in
locations Idle, HoldLeft, and HoldRight. And so on.
Example: Distributed Key-Value Store (Fig. 3). The process shown is phase-compatible. This system
consists of one phase.
Practical Parameterized Verification.Unfortunately, our decidability result yields a decision procedure
for parameterized verification with non-primitive recursive complexity [62] that would also require
significant implementation effort. Hence, we identify additional syntactic conditions, called cutoff-
amenability conditions, that, for a given class of safety properties, enable reducing the parameterized
verification problem for systems with phase-compatible processes to verification of a system with
a small, fixed number of processes. This small, fixed number of processes is called a cutoff, and
essentially entails a small model property: if there exists a counterexample to a safety property in a
system with a certain, possibly large, number of processes, then there exists a counterexample to
the property in a system with a cutoff number of processes.
Example: SATS (Fig. 1). The cutoff for this system and properties is 5. Essentially, due to the nature
of the properties and the structure of the system, any violation of the properties in a system with
more than 5 aircraft can still be reproduced in a system with 5 aircraft. This draws from the fact
that any additional aircraft will not stop the 5 aircraft from potentially violating the properties.
Example: Distributed Key-Value Store (Fig. 3). The cutoff for this system and property (that no 2
processes in location Ret have different values) is 2, since 2 processes are enough to trigger the error
and whether they can reach such an error state does not depend on other processes. In general, the
reachability of an error state may require additional processes, causing the cutoff to increase. While
the cutoff may seem obvious here, in general cutoff arguments are not trivial and deriving cutoff
results requires a deep understanding of the underlying machinery for parameterized verification.
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3 A DISTRIBUTED AGREEMENT-BASED SYSTEMMODELING LANGUAGE
We presentMercury, a language for modeling distributed agreement-based systems. The language
provides special primitives for encapsulating different agreement protocols and includes some de-
sign choices to facilitate automated parameterized verification. We define the syntax and semantics
of Mercury programs, with a detailed treatment of the semantics of its agreement primitives.
3.1 Mercury Syntax and Informal Semantics
Programs. A Mercury program is a collection of an unbounded number 𝑛 of identical system pro-
cesses 𝑃1, 𝑃2, . . . , 𝑃𝑛 and an environment process 𝐸, communicating via events. Each system process
has a unique process index (PID) drawn from the set I𝑛 = {1, 2, . . . , 𝑛}.
Processes. The syntax for aMercury system process is shown in Fig. 5. A process definition begins
with a declaration of typed variables and communication actions, and is followed by a sequence
of locations with a designated initial location. The variable type idSet corresponds to sets of
process indices; the domain of this type is unbounded as the number of system processes is, in
general, unbounded. The variable type int is restricted to a finite domain of integers—this is one
of the inbuilt restrictions inMercury to facilitate automated parameterized verification. Commu-
nication actions either represent communication between system processes or communication
between the environment process and system processes; further, communication actions are either
broadcast actions (denoted br) involving communication from one process to all other processes
or rendezvous actions (denoted rz) involving communication between a pair of processes. Each
communication action act has an optional (finite) integer-valued payload field that can be retrieved
via the expression act.payld.
Each location contains a set of event handlers that consists of an event and a reaction to that
event. An event can be the empty event (_), a receive of any communication action (recv), or one
of two agreement primitives. A handler for an empty event corresponds to a non-reactive action a
process may initiate—an internal computation or a send of a communication action. A Partition
primitive part has two parameters: the set of participants and the number of winners to be chosen.
The set of winners (resp. losers) can be retrieved via the expression part.winS (resp. part.loseS).
A ValueCons primitive cons has three parameters: the set of participants, the number of proposals
to be chosen, and an optional variable (denoted ⟨optIntVar⟩) from which a process proposes its
value. The 𝑘 th value from the set of decided values (denoted cons.decVar) can be retrieved via the
expression cons.decVar[𝑘].
A reaction to an event typically consists of a block of update statements, control statements,
and/or sends. Update statements include assignments to integer variables as well as statements to
add or remove a PID from a set of PIDs. Control statements include conditionals and goto statements
used to switch between locations. A sendrz statement is a rendezvous send that transmits a message
with an action identifier act and an optional payload ⟨optIntVar⟩ to a process with index given by
⟨idExp⟩. A sendbr statement is a broadcast send that transmits a message with an action identifier
act and an optional payload ⟨optIntVar⟩ to all other processes.
Reactions for empty, receive and ValueCons events all begin with do. Additionally, a guarded
reaction of the form where(⟨bExp⟩) do ⟨stmt⟩ can be used for empty and receive events to ensure
that the handler is only enabled if some Boolean predicate evaluates to true. Finally, the reaction
for a Partition event is of the form win: ⟨stmt⟩ lose: ⟨stmt⟩, indicating how a process should
react if it wins and if it loses.
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⟨process⟩ ::= process proc ; variables ⟨vars⟩ ; actions ⟨acts⟩ ; initial ⟨locs⟩
⟨vars⟩ ::= 𝜖 | ⟨vars⟩ ; ⟨vars⟩
| idSet idSetV Set of PIDs initialized to Empty
| int [intConst, intConst] intV Bounded integer initialized to lower bound
| int [intConst, intConst] intV := intConst User-initialized bounded integer
⟨acts⟩ ::= ⟨sysActs⟩ ; ⟨envActs⟩
⟨sysActs⟩ ::= 𝜖 | ⟨sysActs⟩ ; ⟨sysActs⟩
| br act : ⟨payldDom ⟩ Broadcast action
| rz act : ⟨payldDom ⟩ Rendezvous action
⟨envActs⟩ ::= 𝜖 | env ⟨sysActs⟩
⟨payldDom⟩ ::= unit Empty payload
| int [intConst, intConst] Bounded integer payload
⟨locs⟩ ::= ⟨locs⟩ ; ⟨locs⟩
| location loc ⟨handlers⟩
⟨handlers⟩ ::= 𝜖 | ⟨handlers⟩ ; ⟨handlers⟩
| on ⟨event ⟩ ⟨reaction⟩
⟨event ⟩ ::= _ Empty event
| recv(act) Receive event
| Partition<part>(⟨idSetExp⟩, intConst) Partition event
| ValueCons<cons>(⟨idSetExp⟩, intConst, ⟨optIntVar ⟩) ValueCons event
⟨reaction⟩ ::= do ⟨stmt ⟩ Unguarded reaction
| where(⟨bExp⟩) do ⟨stmt ⟩ Guarded reaction
| win: ⟨stmt ⟩ lose: ⟨stmt ⟩ Partition reaction
⟨stmt ⟩ ::= ⟨stmt ⟩ ; ⟨stmt ⟩
| ⟨updateStmt ⟩
| ⟨sendStmt ⟩
| ⟨controlStmt ⟩
⟨updateStmt ⟩ ::= intV := ⟨intExp⟩
| idSetV.add(⟨idExp⟩)
| idSetV.remove(⟨idExp⟩)
⟨sendStmt ⟩ ::= sendrz(act, ⟨optIntVar ⟩, ⟨idExp⟩) Rendezvous send statement
| sendbr(act, ⟨optIntVar ⟩) Broadcast send statement
⟨controlStmt ⟩ ::= if(⟨bExp⟩) ⟨stmt ⟩ else ⟨stmt ⟩
| goto loc
⟨optIntVar ⟩ ::= 𝜖 | intV
Fig. 5. Syntax forMercury. In the grammar, non-terminals are enclosed in ⟨ ⟩, keywords are in boldface,
and all other terminals are monospaced.
An environment process is a simpler version of a system process with variable types restricted
to int and event types restricted to empty and receive events.
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⟨idExp⟩ ::= self PID of current process
| act.sID PID of sender of action act
⟨idSetExp⟩ ::= All | Empty | idSetV
| part.winS Set of winners of Partition primitive part
| part.loseS Set of losers of Partition primitive part
⟨intExp⟩ ::= intConst | intV | ⟨intExp⟩ ⟨arithOp⟩ ⟨intExp⟩
| act.payld Payload of action act
| cons.decVar[intConst] Selecting some decided value of ValueCons primitive cons
⟨bExp⟩ ::= True | False | !⟨bExp⟩
| ⟨bExp⟩ ⟨boolOp⟩ ⟨bExp⟩
| ⟨intExp⟩ ⟨cmpOp⟩ ⟨intExp⟩
| ⟨idExp⟩ ⟨eqOp⟩ ⟨idExp⟩
⟨cmpOp⟩ ::= < | > | <= | >= | ⟨eqOp⟩
⟨eqOp⟩ ::= == | !=
Fig. 6. Syntax of Mercury Expressions.
⟨handlers⟩ ::= passive ⟨eventList ⟩ Handler specifying list of events a process should not react to
⟨eventList ⟩ ::= ⟨eventId ⟩ | ⟨eventId ⟩ , ⟨eventList ⟩
⟨eventId ⟩ ::= act | part | cons
⟨reaction⟩ ::= reply(act, ⟨optIntVar ⟩) A rendezvous reply to the last sender
Fig. 7. Mercury Syntactic Sugar.
Expressions. The syntax for all expressions inMercury processes is shown in Fig. 6. An ⟨idExp⟩
expression evaluates to a PID—self retrieves the PID of the current process and, in a receive han-
dler for communication action act, the expression act.sID retrieves the PID of the corresponding
sender. An ⟨idSetExp⟩ expression evaluates to a set of PIDs as shown and includes the expressions
part.winS and part.loseS introduced earlier. An ⟨intExp⟩ expression evaluates to an integer and
includes the expressions act.payld and cons.decVar[intConst], introduced earlier. A Mercury
arithmetic expression, ⟨arithOp⟩, is standard and is not shown. AMercury Boolean expression,
⟨bExp⟩, constrains comparison of ⟨idExp⟩ expressions to equality and disequality checks; we expand
on this restriction at the end of Sec. 3.2 and emphasize that this is a common syntactic restric-
tion used to facilitate the use of structural symmetries for scalable verification (cf. [28, 29, 36, 67, 68]).
Syntactic Sugar. Mercury provides syntactic sugar to simplify expressing some common idioms,
as shown in Fig. 7.
3.2 Semantics of Mercury Programs without Agreement Primitives
The semantics of Mercury processes and programs is best described using state-transition sys-
tems. We first define the semantics of Mercury programs without agreement primitives and then
extend the definition to Mercury programs with agreement primitives in Sec. 3.3. Intuitively, the
semantics allows non-communicating processes in Mercury programs to operate asynchronously
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⟨iStmt ⟩ ::= ⟨uStmts⟩; goto loc
⟨sStmt ⟩ ::= ⟨sendStmt ⟩; ⟨iStmt ⟩
⟨uStmts⟩ ::= 𝜖 | ⟨updateStmt ⟩ | ⟨uStmts⟩;
⟨uStmts⟩
(a)Mercury Core Statements.
location loc
on _ where (⟨bExp⟩) do
⟨iStmt⟩
(b) Core Internal Handler.
location loc
on _ where (⟨bExp⟩) do
⟨sStmt⟩
(c) Core Send Handler.
location loc
on recv(act) where (⟨bExp⟩) do
⟨iStmt⟩
(d) Core Receive Handler.
location loc
on Partition<part>(⟨idSetExp⟩,intConst)
win: goto loc lose: goto loc
(e) Core Partition Handler.
location loc
on ValueCons<cons>(⟨idSetExp⟩,intConst,⟨optIntVar⟩)
goto loc
(f) Core ValueCons Handler.
Fig. 8. Syntax of CoreMercury.
while ensuring that communication and agreement is synchronous and consistent.
Core Fragment of Mercury. To enable a succinct description of the semantics of Mercury
programs, we rewrite process definitions into a core fragment of the language with the event
handlers and statements depicted in Fig. 8. The handlers may contain two types of statements
(shown in Fig. 8a): a statement ⟨iStmt⟩ that consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of update
statements, followed by a goto statement; and a statement ⟨sStmt⟩ that consists of a send statement,
followed by an ⟨iStmt⟩ statement. The internal core handler in Fig. 8b embodies computations
that the process does internally, i.e., without communication with other processes; the send core
handler in Fig. 8c embodies a send of some action by a process; and the receive core handler in
Fig. 8d embodies the reaction of a process to a receive of some action. Note that all three handlers
are guarded by a predicate that dictates when they are enabled. The core handlers in Fig. 8e and
Fig. 8f are for agreement primitives and only contain goto statements as shown.
For the rest of this paper, let 𝑃 be a process in the core frament of Mercury. With some abuse of
notation, we use 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑠 , 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 , and 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑠 to refer to the sets of variables, actions, and locations in their
eponymous sequences in Fig. 5. Finally, for a non-terminal ⟨expr⟩, we denote by 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 the concrete
expression matched by the non-terminal.
Process Semantics. The semantics of a process 𝑃 is defined as a labeled state-transition system
(𝑆, 𝑠0, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠,𝑇 ), where 𝑆 is the set of (local) states, 𝑠0 is the initial state, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 is the set of actions, and
𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆×{sendrz, sendbr, recvrz, recvbr, 𝜖}×𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠×I𝑛×𝑆 is the set of (local) labeled transitions of
𝑃 . A state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is a pair (loc, 𝜎) where loc ∈ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑠 is a location and 𝜎 is a valuation of the variables
in 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑠 . We let 𝜎 (𝑣𝑎𝑟 ) denote the value of the variable 𝑣𝑎𝑟 according to 𝜎 . For a state 𝑠 = (loc, 𝜎),
we let 𝑠 .𝑙𝑜𝑐 denote the location loc in 𝑠 , and 𝑠 .𝜎 (𝑣𝑎𝑟 ) denote the value 𝜎 (𝑣𝑎𝑟 ) of variable 𝑣𝑎𝑟 in 𝑠 .
Similarly, we use 𝜎 (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 ) (𝑠 .𝜎 (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 )) to denote the value of expression 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟 evaluated under 𝜎 (in
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state 𝑠). The initial state 𝑠0 = (loc0, 𝜎0), where loc0 denotes the initial location and 𝜎0 denotes the
initial variable valuation.
A transition of process 𝑃 without agreement primitives corresponds to the execution of one of
the three core event handlers in Fig. 8b, Fig. 8c, and Fig. 8d; a transition is labeled either with a
send/receive of a communication action in 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑠 or an empty label 𝜖 denoting an internal transition.
For each core handler, let loc denote the current location and loc′ denote the target location of
the goto statement. Then, the transitions in 𝑇 are defined as follows:
(a) For each internal handler as shown in Fig. 8b, 𝑇 contains a transition (loc, 𝜎) 𝜖−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′)
for each 𝜎 such that 𝜎 (𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 , and 𝜎 ′ is obtained from 𝜎 by applying2 the sequence of
updates ⟨uStmts⟩.
(b) For each rendezvous send handler as shown in Fig. 8c with ⟨sendStmt⟩ given by sendrz(act,
⟨optIntVar⟩,⟨idExp⟩), 𝑇 contains a transition (loc, 𝜎) sendrz(act,𝑃𝐼𝐷)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′) for each 𝜎 such
that 𝜎 (𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 , 𝜎 (𝑖𝑑𝐸𝑥𝑝) = 𝑃𝐼𝐷 , and 𝜎 ′ is obtained from 𝜎 by applying the sequence
of updates ⟨uStmts⟩. Note that if ⟨optIntVar⟩ is 𝜖 , the payload is empty and if ⟨optIntVar⟩ is a
variable, that we denote by 𝑣𝑎𝑟act, the payload is 𝜎 (𝑣𝑎𝑟act).
(c) Similarly, for each broadcast send handler as shown in Fig. 8c with ⟨sendStmt⟩ given by
sendbr(act,⟨optIntVar⟩), 𝑇 contains a transition (loc, 𝜎) sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′) for each 𝜎
such that 𝜎 (𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 and 𝜎 ′ is obtained from 𝜎 by applying the sequence of updates
⟨uStmts⟩. The payload is determined by⟨optIntVar⟩ as before.
(d) For each rendezvous receive handler as shown in Fig. 8d with rendezvous action act,𝑇 contains
a transition (loc, 𝜎) recvrz(act)−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′) for each 𝜎 such that 𝜎 (𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 , and 𝜎 ′ is
obtained from 𝜎 by applying the sequence of updates ⟨uStmts⟩. Note that ⟨uStmts⟩ may access
the received value using the expression act.payld.
(e) Similarly, for each broadcast receive handler as shown in Fig. 8d with broadcast action act, 𝑇
contains a transition (loc, 𝜎) recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′) for each 𝜎 such that 𝜎 (𝑏𝐸𝑥𝑝) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 and
𝜎 ′ is obtained from 𝜎 by applying the sequence of updates ⟨uStmts⟩.
We use 𝐸 to denote the environment process and use 𝑆𝐸, 𝑠0,𝐸 etc. to denote its set of states, initial
state etc., respectively.
Distributed Program Semantics. The semantics of a Mercury program consisting of 𝑛 identical
system processes 𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛 and the environment process 𝐸 is defined as a state-transition system
M(𝑛) = (𝑄,𝑞0, 𝑅), parameterized by the number of processes 𝑛, where:
(1) 𝑄 = 𝑆𝑛 × 𝑆𝐸 is the set of global states,
(2) 𝑞0 = (𝑠0, . . . , 𝑠0, 𝑠0,𝐸) is the initial global state, and
(3) 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑄 ×𝑄 is the set of global transitions such that (𝑞, 𝑞′) ∈ 𝑅 iff one of the following holds:
• two processes synchronize on a rendezvous communication action:
there exist processes 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃 𝑗 with local transitions 𝑠𝑖
sendrz(act,𝑃𝐼𝐷)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′𝑖 and 𝑠 𝑗
recvrz(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′𝑗
such that 𝑞′ = 𝑞 [𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑠 ′𝑖 , 𝑠 𝑗 ← 𝑠 ′𝑗 ], 𝑃𝐼𝐷 = 𝑗 , and if ⟨optIntVar⟩ is the variable 𝑣𝑎𝑟act,
𝑠𝑖 .𝜎 (𝑣𝑎𝑟act) = act.payld.
• processes synchronize on a broadcast communication action:
there exists a process 𝑃𝑖 with 𝑠𝑖
sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′𝑖 and every other process 𝑃 𝑗 with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 has a
2𝜎′ is obtained from 𝜎 by updating the values of int variables according to the assignment statements in ⟨uStmts⟩ and the
values of idSet variables by adding or removing PIDs according to the corresponding statements in ⟨uStmts⟩.
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transition 𝑠 𝑗
recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′𝑗 such that 𝑞′ = 𝑞 [𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑠 ′𝑖 ,∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 : 𝑠 𝑗 ← 𝑠 ′𝑗 ] and if ⟨optIntVar⟩ is
the variable 𝑣𝑎𝑟act, 𝑠𝑖 .𝜎 (𝑣𝑎𝑟act) = act.payld.
• one process makes an asynchronous internal move:
there exists a process 𝑃𝑖 with a local transition 𝑠𝑖
𝜖−→ 𝑠 ′𝑖 and 𝑞′ = 𝑞 [𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑠 ′𝑖 ].
In the above, 𝑞 [𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑠 ′𝑖 ] indicates that process 𝑃𝑖 changes state from 𝑠𝑖 to 𝑠 ′𝑖 .
An execution of a global transition system M(𝑛) is a (possibly infinite) sequence of states,
𝑞0, 𝑞1, . . ., in 𝑄 such that for each 𝑗 ≥ 0, (𝑞 𝑗 , 𝑞 𝑗+1) ∈ 𝑅. A state 𝑞 is reachable if there exists a finite
execution ofM(𝑛) that ends in 𝑞.
In what follows, we useM andM(𝑛) interchangeably, using the latter only when we need to
make the parameter 𝑛 explicit. Additionally, we refer to a system process simply as a process, unless
necessary.
Correctness Specifications. In this work, we focus on a broad class of invariant properties of
systemsmodeled inMercury. In particular, our correctness specifications are Boolean combinations
of universally quantified formulas over locations, int variables, and a finite number of variables
with distinct valuations over I𝑛 .
For example, one can specify that a location 𝑐 is a critical section (of size 1) as:∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ I𝑛 .¬(𝑞 [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 =
𝑐 ∧ 𝑞 [ 𝑗] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 𝑐); our SATS example (Fig. 1) uses correctness specifications of this form. As another
example, one can specify that all processes in some location𝑑 must have the same value in their local
variable 𝑣 as: ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ I𝑛 .𝑞 [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 𝑑 ∧ 𝑞 [ 𝑗] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 𝑑 =⇒ 𝑞 [𝑖] .𝜎 (𝑣) = 𝑞 [ 𝑗] .𝜎 (𝑣); our Distributed
Key-Value Store example (Fig. 3) uses a correctness specification of this form.
The programM(𝑛) is safe if it has no reachable states that violate its correctness specification.
Given a specification 𝜙 (𝑛), we use the standard notationM(𝑛) |= 𝜙 (𝑛) to denote thatM(𝑛) is safe.
Symmetry for Efficient, Parameterized Verification. The ability to do automated parameterized
verification for systems with an arbitrary number of processes hinges on the number of different
types of processes being bounded (in our system model, there are two types of processes, system and
environment). Thus, parameterized systems naturally exhibit many similar global behaviors that are
independent of specific process indices. The symmetric nature of such global behaviors additionally
offers another advantage: it is possible to greatly improve the verification time complexity of
symmetric systems through symmetry reduction [28].
In particular, a (global) state-transition systemM is said to be fully-symmetric if its transition
relation 𝑅 is invariant under permutations over the set I𝑛 of PIDs: ∀𝜋 ∈ 𝑃𝐺. 𝜋 (𝑅) = 𝑅, where
𝑃𝐺 is the set of all permutations over I𝑛 and 𝜋 (𝑅) = {(𝜋 (𝑞1), 𝜋 (𝑞2)) | (𝑞1, 𝑞2) ∈ 𝑅}. As noted in
Sec. 3.1, Mercury syntactically constrains comparison of ⟨idExp⟩ expressions (i.e., expressions
that evaluate to a PID) to equality and disequality checks. This is a sufficient condition to ensure
that Mercury processes are fully-symmetric and, hence, enable parameterized verification and
symmetry reduction. We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for a detailed treatment of full symmetry.
3.3 Semantics of Mercury programs with Agreement Primitives
We now extend the process and program semantics defined in Sec. 3.2 to Mercury programs with
agreement primitives. Furthermore, we show that our definition of the semantics of agreement
primitives provides a sound abstraction of agreement protocols and enables symmetry reduction.
To simplify the presentation of the semantics, we expand the set 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑠 of variables as follows.
For each Partition event part, we add variables part_winS and part_loseS for storing the sets
of winners and losers, respectively. Similarly, for each ValueCons event cons, we add variable
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cons_decVar for storing the decided values.
Process-level Semantics of Agreement Primitives. For the Partition event handler (Fig. 8e),
let loc denote the current location and loc𝑤 (resp. loc𝑙 ) denote the target location of the goto
statement in the win: (resp. lose:) block. For the ValueCons event handler (Fig. 8f), let loc denote
the current location and loc𝑑 denote the target location of the goto statement. Then, the set 𝑇 of
transitions is extended as follows:
(a) For each Partition handler with event Partition<part>(⟨idSetExp⟩,intConst) in Fig. 8e,
𝑇 contains transitions (loc, 𝜎) win:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc𝑤, 𝜎 ′) and (loc, 𝜎)
lose:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(loc𝑙 , 𝜎 ′) for each 𝜎 such that pcpt denotes the set of participants3 matched by ⟨idSetExp⟩, 𝑘
denotes the number of winners to be decided as given by intConst, and 𝜎 ′ is obtained from 𝜎
by updating the variables part_WinS and part_loseS to the sets of winners and losers agreed
upon in the global invocation of part, respectively.
(b) For each ValueCons handler with event ValueCons<cons>(⟨idSetExp⟩, intConst, ⟨optIntVar⟩)
in Fig. 8f, 𝑇 contains a local transition (loc, 𝜎) 𝑉𝐶cons (pcpt,𝑘,pVar)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc𝑑 , 𝜎 ′) for each 𝜎 such
that pcpt and 𝑘 are as before, pVar denotes the variable from which a process proposes its
value, matched by ⟨optIntVar⟩ if ⟨optIntVar⟩ is not 𝜖 , and 𝜎 ′ is obtained from 𝜎 by updating the
variable cons_decVar to the decided values in the global invocation of cons.
Program-level Semantics of Agreement Primitives. The local transitions corresponding to agree-
ment primitives are essentially modeling invocation of verified agreement protocols that enable a
set of participants to decide on a finite set of winners/values in a globally consistent way. As stated
in Sec. 2, verified agreement protocols typically entail agreement, validity, and termination. Thus, to
ensure that agreement primitives provide a sound abstraction of verified agreement protocols, the
global behavior of these primitives must satisfy a set of conditions entailed by agreement, validity,
and termination. We represent this set of conditions on the global transitions corresponding to
agreement primitives as a precondition-postcondition pair, stated informally as:
𝐶1: Consistent Participants Precondition. The participants agree on with whom to invoke agree-
ment4, and,
𝐶2: Consistent Decisions Postcondition. Upon termination of agreement, all participants concur on
set of winners/values.
In what follows, we present the global transitions and specialization of the precondition-
postcondition pair (C1,C2) for each type of agreement primitive.
Partition. Consider an instance of a Partition agreement primitive with identifier part and
local transitions (loc𝑐 , 𝜎) win:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc𝑐𝑤, 𝜎 ′) and (loc𝑐 , 𝜎)
lose:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc𝑐𝑙 , 𝜎 ′).
Let 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑠part be the set of all locations loc𝑐 from which the participants of this instance may invoke
Partition (i.e., all locations where the above two transitions originate).
We extend the global transition relation 𝑅 ofM with a Partition agreement transition from a
global state 𝑞start to a global state 𝑞Wend encoding a selected setW of 𝑘5 winners if:
3While such sets are usually predefined, we allow more flexibility by permitting processes to communicate and construct
them.
4Note that systems in which all processes intend to reach agreement (e.g., in the Distributed Key-Value Store example in
Fig. 3) trivially satisfy the𝐶1. The more general form of𝐶1 is to enable systems to invoke agreement protocols with only a
subset of processes (e.g., in the SATS example Fig. 1, only aircraft in the Enter location participate in agreement leading to
the HoldLeft and HoldRight locations).
5If the number of participants is less than 𝑘 , then all participants act as winners.
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𝐶1 (𝑃𝐶): There exists a set S ⊆ I𝑛 of processes in 𝑞start in appropriate locations for invoking this
instance of the Partition primitive and with a consistent view of each other. Formally:
(1) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑞start [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 ∈ 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑠part and
(2) ∀𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ S : 𝑞start [𝑖] .𝜎 (pcpt) = 𝑞start [ 𝑗] .𝜎 (pcpt) = S, and,
𝐶2 (𝑃𝐶): The processes of S move to their appropriate target locations in 𝑞Wend based on whether
they win or lose and their part_winS and part_LoseS variables in 𝑞Wend are updated to reflect
the partition. Formally:
(1) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑖 ∈ W ∧ 𝑞start [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = loc𝑐 =⇒ 𝑞Wend [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = loc𝑐𝑤 ,
(2) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑖 ∉W ∧ 𝑞start [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = loc𝑐 =⇒ 𝑞Wend [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = loc𝑐𝑙 ,
(3) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑞Wend [𝑖] .𝜎 (part_winS) =W,
(4) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑞Wend [𝑖] .𝜎 (part_LoseS) = S \W,
(5) ∀𝑖 ∈ I𝑛 \ S : 𝑞Wend [𝑖] = 𝑞start [𝑖].
ValueCons. Consider an instance of a ValueCons agreement primitive with identifier cons and
local transition (loc𝑐 , 𝜎) 𝑉𝐶cons (pcpt,𝑘,pVar)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc𝑐𝑑 , 𝜎 ′). As before, let 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑠cons be the set of locations
loc𝑐 from which the participants of this cons instance may start.
We extend the global transition relation 𝑅 ofM with a ValueCons agreement transition from a
global state 𝑞start to a global state 𝑞Wend encoding a selected setW of 𝑘 decided values if:
𝐶1 (𝑉𝐶): The state 𝑞start is as defined for Partition, and,
𝐶2 (𝑉𝐶): The processes of S move to their target locations in 𝑞Wend and their cons_decVar variables
are updated to reflect the decided values. Formally:
(1) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑞start [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = loc𝑐 =⇒ 𝑞Wend [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 = loc𝑐𝑑 ,
(2) ∀𝑖 ∈ S : 𝑞Wend [𝑖] .𝜎 (cons_decVar) =W,
(3) ∀𝑖 ∈ I𝑛 \ S : 𝑞Wend [𝑖] = 𝑞start [𝑖].
Example.We illustrate the behavior of global agreement transitions from a state 𝑞start of a 2-process
system (the relevant parts of which are shown in Fig. 9a).
First, consider a scenario where the Partition handler shown in Fig. 9b is part of the process def-
inition. The state 𝑞start is a state satisfying precondition𝐶1 (𝑃𝐶) since both processes 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are
in location loc and have consistent participant sets (since 𝑞start [1] .𝜎 (pcpt) = 𝑞start [2] .𝜎 (pcpt) =
{1, 2}). Here, processes 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 wish to pick one winner to transition to location loc𝑤 , with the
loser transitioning to location loc𝑙 . The agreement transition 𝑞start −→ 𝑞𝑃1end (resp. 𝑞start −→ 𝑞𝑃2end),
shown in the top half of Fig. 9a, models the instance where 𝑃1 (resp. 𝑃2) is selected as the winning
process. Each participant’s part_winS and part_loseS variables are updated to reflect the winning
(resp. losing) processes. The states 𝑞𝑃1end and 𝑞
𝑃2
end each satisfy the postcondition 𝐶2 (𝑃𝐶).
Next, consider a scenario where the ValueCons handler in Fig. 9c is part of the process defini-
tion. Again, 𝑞start satisfies precondition 𝐶1 (𝑉𝐶). Processes 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 propose the values 𝑥 and 𝑦,
respectively, and try to reach agreement on 1 value. The agreement transition 𝑞start −→ 𝑞𝑥end (resp.
𝑞start −→ 𝑞𝑦end), shown in the bottom half of Fig. 9a, models the case where 𝑥 (resp. 𝑦) is the decided
value stored in each participant’s cons_decVar variable. Observe that both processes transition to
the same location loc𝑑 and that the states 𝑞𝑥end and 𝑞
𝑦
end each satisfy the postcondition 𝐶2 (𝑉𝐶).
Soundness.We can now state the soundness of our abstraction of agreement protocols.
Lemma 3.1. Our proposed abstraction of agreement protocols, as defined using the syntax and
semantics of Mercury agreement primitives, is sound.
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locd {𝑥} locd {𝑥}𝑙𝑜𝑐 dVar 𝑙𝑜𝑐 dVar locd {𝑦} locd {𝑦}𝑙𝑜𝑐 dVar 𝑙𝑜𝑐 dVar
locw {1} {2} locl {1} {2}𝑙𝑜𝑐 winS loseS 𝑙𝑜𝑐 winS loseS𝑃! 𝑃"
loc 𝑥 ∗ {1,2} ∗ ∗ loc 𝑦 ∗ {1,2} ∗ ∗𝑙𝑜𝑐 pVar dVar pcpt winS loseS 𝑙𝑜𝑐 pVar dVar pcpt winS loseS
𝑞#$%&$
𝑞'()*!𝑞!"#$"
𝑞!"#%
locl {2} {1} locw {2} {1}𝑙𝑜𝑐 winS loseS 𝑙𝑜𝑐 winS loseS
𝑞!"#&
(a) Partial global transition system depicting various agreement transitions. Here, cons_decVar, part_winS,
and part_loseS are abbreviated as dVar, winS, and loseS. The empty fields in the global end states are for
variables with unchanged values.
location loc
on Partition<part>(pcpt, 1)
win: goto loc𝑤 lose: goto loc𝑙
(b) Partition Handler.
location loc
on ValueCons<cons>(pcpt, 1, pVar)
goto loc𝑑
(c) ValueCons Handler.
Fig. 9. Example: Global Agreement Transitions.
Proof Sketch. Recall that we assume that the agreement protocols modeled inMercury using agree-
ment primitives are verified and, hence, entail agreement, validity and termination. The soundness
of agreement primitives can be shown by proving that agreement, validity, and termination imply
the semantics of agreement primitives captured by the precondition-postcondition pair (𝐶1,𝐶2).
We prove this by contradiction. Assume that an agreement protocol satisfies agreement, validity,
and termination, but violates (𝐶1,𝐶2). A violation of precondition 𝐶1 contradicts agreement and
validity. A violation of postcondition 𝐶2 (i.e., participants not agreeing on the same winner/value
or agreeing on a winner/value that was not in the set of participants/was never proposed) also
contradicts agreement and validity. Finally, a violation due to the absence of a transition between a
state 𝑞start satisfying 𝐶1 and a state 𝑞Wend satisfying 𝐶2 directly contradicts termination.
Symmetry. In a (global) state-transition system,Magree = (𝑄,𝑞0, 𝑅), capturing the semantics of a
Mercury program, let 𝑅agree denote the set of all transitions corresponding to agreement primitives
in the transition relation 𝑅. LetM = (𝑄,𝑞0, 𝑅 \ 𝑅agree) denote the state-transition system without
the agreement transitions ofMagree.
Lemma 3.2. IfM is fully-symmetric, thenMagree is fully-symmetric.
We refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for the proof. Intuitively, the proof is based on the obser-
vation that agreement transitions are oblivious to the identities of the participants and are hence
invariant under permutations over I𝑛 .
Remark.We do not make any symmetry-related assumptions about the specific agreement protocol
that an agreement primitive encapsulates. In particular, the underlying agreement protocol could
employ non-symmetric strategies such as “the process with maximum PID wins”.
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4 PARAMETERIZED VERIFICATION OFMERCURY PROGRAMS
In this section, we formalize the parameterized verification problem forMercury programs and
present our main theoretical results for enabling decidable and efficient parameterized verification.
Definition 4.1 (The Parameterized Verification Problem for Mercury Programs). Given a Mercury
system process 𝑃 , a Mercury environment process 𝐸, and a parameterized safety specification
𝜙 (𝑛) as defined in Sec. 3, the goal is to decide if ∀𝑛. M(𝑛) |= 𝜙 (𝑛).
The parameterized verification problem is known to be undecidable. Our first result (Sec. 4.1)
identifies conditions onMercury programs and the specification 𝜙 (𝑛) for enabling decidability
of the problem in Def. 4.1. Our second result (Sec. 4.2) identifies additional conditions for which
this problem is efficiently decidable, based on cutoff results. Cutoff results enable reduction of the
parameterized verification problem to a verification problem over a fixed number of processes.
Formally, a cutoff for a class of processes Π (including system process 𝑃 and environment process
𝐸) and a class of specifications Φ (including specification 𝜙) is a number 𝑐 ∈ N such that:
∀𝑛 ≥ 𝑐. (M(𝑐) |= 𝜙 (𝑐) ⇐⇒ M(𝑛) |= 𝜙 (𝑛)) .
Our second result, to be more specific, identifies conditions onMercury programs for small cutoffs,
thus reducing the problem in Def. 4.1 to verification of aMercury program with a small number
of processes. The latter problem is decidable for any Mercury program, as the corresponding
semantics can be expressed as a finite-state machine.
For the rest of this section, we fix aMercury process 𝑃 with a set of process-local states 𝑆 , initial
state 𝑠0, and process-local transitions 𝑇 .
4.1 Decidable Parameterized Verification
Our conditions onMercury programs for decidable parameterized verification essentially corre-
spond to distributed systems that proceed in phases. Informally, a phase captures the notion of a
region in the local state space where processes may coexist—phases are subsets of the local state
space of a process such that each process is always in the same phase as every other process and all
processes simultaneously move from one phase to the next by synchronizing through a broadcast
communication action or an agreement primitive. Before presenting the decidability conditions,
we formalize this notion of phases.
Phases. In what follows, in a slight departure from terminology in Sec. 3, we use events to refer to
communication actions and instances of agreement primitives. We refer to the set of events consist-
ing of broadcast actions and instances of Partition and ValueCons in 𝑃 as global-synchronizing
events and denote this set as 𝐸global. We denote the set of rendezvous actions in 𝑃 as 𝐸rend.
For each event e, we define its source set, denoted 𝑠𝑟𝑐e, as the set of states in 𝑆 from which there
exists a transition in 𝑇 labeled with e. Similarly, we define the destination set of each event e,
denoted 𝑑𝑠𝑡e, as the set of states in 𝑆 to which a transition in 𝑇 labeled with e exists. For instance,
if e is a broadcast action act, 𝑠𝑟𝑐act = {𝑠 | 𝑠 sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑇 ∨ 𝑠 recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑇 } and
𝑑𝑠𝑡act = {𝑠 ′ | 𝑠 sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑇 ∨ 𝑠 recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑇 }. The source and destination sets for
rendezvous actions and instances of ValueCons and Partition can be defined similarly.
Finally, we define the relationR ⊆ 𝑆×𝑆 to denote pairs of states related via internal or rendezvous
transitions as follows:
R = {(𝑠, 𝑡) | 𝑠 ≠ 𝑡 ∧ (𝑠 𝜖−→ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 ∨ 𝑡 𝜖−→ 𝑠 ∈ 𝑇 ∨ (∃e ∈ 𝐸rend . {𝑠, 𝑡} ⊆ 𝑠𝑟𝑐e ∪ 𝑑𝑠𝑡e))}.
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We can now present a constructive definition for the set of phases of 𝑆 . Intuitively, two states
are in the same phase if they are part of the same source or destination set, or, their phases are
connected by internal or rendezvous transitions.
Definition 4.2 (Phases). The set of phases is constructed as follows:
(1) Intialization: The set of phases is initialized to the set of source sets and destination sets of
each globally-synchronizing event:
inPhases =
⋃
e∈𝐸global
{
𝑠𝑟𝑐e, 𝑑𝑠𝑡e
}
.
(2) Expansion: Each initial phase is then expanded such that if a state 𝑠 is in a phase, then every
state 𝑡 such that R(𝑠, 𝑡) is in the phase too:
exPhases =
⋃
𝑋 ∈inPhases
{
𝑋 ∪ {𝑡 | 𝑠 ∈ 𝑋 ∧ R+ (𝑠, 𝑡)}},
where R+ is the transitive closure of R.
(3) Merge: Finally, expanded phases that contain distinct states 𝑠 , 𝑡 with R(𝑠, 𝑡) are merged:
𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 =
{ ⋃
𝑊 ∈𝑋
𝑊 | 𝑋 ⊆ exPhases ∧ ∀ 𝑌, 𝑍 ∈ 𝑋 . R+𝑝ℎ (𝑌, 𝑍 )
}
,
where R𝑝ℎ = {(𝑋,𝑌 ) | ∃𝑠 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑌 . R(𝑠, 𝑡)} and R+𝑝ℎ is the transitive closure of R𝑝ℎ .
This definition ensures that (i) all the processes in the system are in the same phase at any
given time in a program execution, (ii) processes move between phases strictly using globally-
synchronizing events, and (iii) within a phase, processes can communicate using any type of
communication (e.g., processes can even communicate using a globally-synchronizing event e if
the phase is obtained by merging phases containing 𝑠𝑟𝑐e and 𝑑𝑠𝑡e, resp., in Step (3)).
Acting and Reacting Transitions.We define a classification of local transitions corresponding
to globally-synchronizing events into acting and reacting transitions:
(1) Broadcast: sending transitions 𝑠
sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ are acting transitions and receiving transitions
𝑠
recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ are reacting transitions.
(2) Partition: winning transitions 𝑠
win:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ are acting transitions and losing transi-
tions 𝑠
lose:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ are reacting transitions.
(3) ValueCons: transitions 𝑠
𝑉𝐶cons (pcpt,𝑘,pVar)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ are reacting transitions and are additionally also
considered to be acting transitions if the proposed value 𝑠 .𝜎 (pVar) is in the set of decided
values 𝑠 ′.𝜎 (cons_decVar) (i.e., if the process taking the transition may have proposed a
decided value).
The transitions taken by non-participating processes (identified by passive) are reacting transitions.
Phase-compatibility Conditions. We can now present conditions on Mercury programs for
enabling decidability of the parameterized verification problem in Def. 4.1. Informally, these condi-
tions, called phase-compatibility conditions, ensure that all processes in the system move in phases
such that (i) the system’s ability to move between phases is independent of the number of processes,
(ii) once a process is ready to leave the current phase, all other processes can reach a state where
they can leave as well, and (iii) if a process moves into a state with an acting transition, all other
processes can reach a state where they can react to the transition.
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For each event e ∈ 𝐸global, let 𝑠 𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ (resp. 𝑠 𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′) denote a local acting (resp. reacting)
transition of e. Furthermore, let 𝑠 𝑅 (e) 𝑠 ′ denote a path 𝑠 →∗ 𝑠 ′′ 𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ such that 𝑠 →∗ 𝑠 ′′ is a
path of internal transitions and 𝑠 ′′
𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′. Additionally, we denote by 𝑠 inrz−−−→ 𝑠 ′ an internal or
rendezvous transition. Finally, let 𝑝ℎ(𝑠) denote the set of all phases that contain state 𝑠 .
Definition 4.3 (Phase-Compatibility Conditions).
(1) The state space of 𝑃 is fixed and finite6.
(2) There exists at most one rendezvous-receive transition per action per phase. Under full
symmetry, this condition ensures that abstracting the receiver PID (in any rendezvous-send
transition 𝑠
sendrz(act,𝑃𝐼𝐷)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′) does not introduce spurious behaviors.
(3) Every state in 𝑃 which has an acting transition must have a corresponding reacting transition
from the same state:
∀e ∈ 𝐸global . 𝑠 𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ =⇒ 𝑠 𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′′
(4) For each acting transition 𝑠
𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ of a globally-synchronizing event e such that there exists
an outgoing reacting transition 𝑠 ′
𝑅 (f)−−−→ 𝑠 ′′ of some globally-synchronizing event f from 𝑠 ′, (i)
all other such acting transitions 𝑡
𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑡 ′ must transition to a state 𝑡 ′ with the same outgoing
reacting transition 𝑡 ′
𝑅 (f)−−−→ 𝑡 ′′ and (ii) every destination state 𝑢 ′ of a corresponding reacting
transition 𝑢
𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑢 ′ must have a path to a state where the same outgoing reacting transition
exists:
∀e, f ∈ 𝐸global .
(
𝑠
𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∧ 𝑠 ′ 𝑅 (f)−−−→ 𝑠 ′′
)
=⇒(
∀𝑡 𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑡 ′.∃𝑡 ′ 𝑅 (f)−−−→ 𝑡 ′′
)
∧
(
∀𝑢 𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑢 ′.∃𝑢 ′ 𝑅 (f) 𝑢 ′′
)
(5) For each internal or rendezvous transition 𝑠 inrz−−−→ 𝑠 ′ such that there exists an outgoing
reacting transition 𝑠 ′
𝑅 (f)−−−→ 𝑠 ′′ from 𝑠 ′, for every state 𝑡 ∈ 𝑋 for some phase 𝑋 ∈ 𝑝ℎ(𝑠), 𝑡 must
have a path to a state where the same outgoing reacting transition exists:
∀f ∈ 𝐸global .
(
𝑠
inrz−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∧ 𝑠 ′ 𝑅 (f)−−−→ 𝑠 ′′
)
=⇒
(
∀𝑋 ∈ 𝑝ℎ(𝑠), 𝑡 ∈ 𝑋 . ∃𝑡 𝑅 (f) 𝑡 ′
)
A process that satisfies the phase-compatibility conditions in Def. 4.3 is called phase-compatible.
Note that, while the last two conditions may be hard to evaluate by a human designer in gen-
eral, they are trivially satisfied in many common cases. For example, (4) is satisfied for 𝑠
𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′
whenever from state 𝑠 ′ there is no reacting transition of a globally-synchronizing event, which
is common if on e the system moves into a new phase, where processes progress by internal or
rendezvous transitions before synchronizing again globally. Similarly, (5) is satisfied if the program
is such that event f marks the end of a phase, and in the current phase every process can make
progress towards 𝑠𝑟𝑐f, even without interacting with other processes. Moreover, note that our tool,
QuickSilver, not only automatically checks these conditions, but also gives the designer feedback
6We note that this condition restricts the way participant sets of agreement primitives are built to the constant set All or
the result of a previous Partition instance part (part.winS or part.loseS), hence ensuring the precondition of agreement
is naturally met. In general, this condition can be relaxed to include some systems with an unbounded state space where
such sets are built through communication (see Appendix B.5).
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on how one can modify the program to obtain a phase-compatible process (compare Sec. 5.1).
Permissible Safety Specification. Let 𝑓 be a Boolean formula over locations and int variables of
aMercury process. Let 𝑓𝑖 be the Boolean formula 𝑓 indexed by the PID 𝑖 . For instance, the Boolean
formula 𝑓 = 𝑠 .𝑙𝑜𝑐 ≠ 𝑐 ∧ 𝑠 .𝜎 (𝑣) < 1 has the indexed formula 𝑓𝑖 = 𝑞 [𝑖] .𝑙𝑜𝑐 ≠ 𝑐 ∧ 𝑞 [𝑖] .𝜎 (𝑣) < 1. Let
𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑚 be variables with distinct valuations over I𝑛 . Then, define 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) as:
𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) = ∀𝑖1, . . . , 𝑖𝑚 . ¬
(
𝑓𝑖1 ∧ . . . ∧ 𝑓𝑖𝑚
)
Let 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ) = {𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 | 𝑓 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒} be the set of process-local states where the Boolean formula
𝑓 holds. Intuitively, the formula 𝑓 encodes a set 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ) of process-local states and the property
𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) forbids the reachability of a global state where𝑚 or more processes are in the set of local
states 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ). We call formulas of the form 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) permissible safety specifications and note
that all examples of specifications in this paper can be expressed using this form.
Theorem 4.4. The parameterized verification problem in Def. 4.1 is decidable if Mercury system
process 𝑃 is phase-compatible and parameterized safety specification 𝜙 (𝑛) is permissible.
Proof Intuition. We utilize decidability results for a new model of distributed systems, called Global
Synchronization Protocols (GSP), presented in [37]. While the expressiveness of Mercury programs
and GSP models is incomparable, we can show that for each phase-compatible process 𝑃Merc, one
can construct a corresponding process 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 in the GSP model such that there exists a simulation
equivalence between 𝑃Merc and 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , and that 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 is well-behaved, i.e., falls in the decidable
fragment identified in [37].
Informally, the enabled transitions of a system composed of well-behaved GSP processes is invari-
ant w.r.t. the number of processes. For a phase-compatible 𝑃Merc (i) all the processes in the system
are in the same phase at any given time in a program execution, and (ii) our phase-compatibility
conditions ensure that the set of globally-synchronizing events (and thus, all transitions) which
may be enabled is the same for all processes in a given phase, the set of enabled transitions is the
same for all processes in the system. We refer the reader to Appendix B.3 for the full proof.
4.2 Efficient Parameterized Verification using Cutoffs
We define additional conditions on Mercury processes to obtain small cutoffs and enable efficient
parameterized verification.
We first define a notion of independence of transitions and paths of a process. Informally, indepen-
dent transitions do not require the existence of other processes in certain states (e.g., in Partition
agreement, the winning transition is independent since a winning process does not require the
existence of a losing process to take that transition, but the losing transition is not independent
since the losing process requires the existence of a winning process to take that transition.)
Definition 4.5 (Independent Transitions and Paths). A transition of 𝑃 is independent if it is:
(1) an internal transition,
(2) a sending transition of some broadcast action,
(3) a winning transition 𝑠
win:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ of some Partition instance part,
(4) a receiving transition 𝑠
recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ of a broadcast action with amatching sending transition
𝑠
sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′, or
(5) an acting transition of some ValueCons instance with 𝑘 = 1.
A path is independent if all transitions along the path are independent.
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The cutoff-amenability conditions we define below ensure that a global error state, where 𝑚
processes are in local states 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ) violating a permissible safety specification 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛), can
be reached in a system with exactly𝑚 processes. This requires the conditions to ensure that the
reachability of this global error state by𝑚 processes does not depend on the existence of any additional
processes. While the conditions allow for transitions that are not independent, they ensure that the
corresponding required processes (to enable such transitions) are available inM(𝑚).
Definition 4.6 (Cutoff-Amenability Conditions). Let 𝑃 be a phase-compatible process, 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛)
a permissible specification , and let F be the set of independent simple paths from 𝑠0 to a state
𝑠 ∈ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ). We require either of the following to hold.
(1) All paths from 𝑠0 to 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ) are independent, or
(2) For each acting transition 𝑠
𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ for some globally-synchronizing event e:
(a) the transition 𝑠
𝐴(e)−−−→ 𝑠 ′ does not appear in paths in F and any corresponding reacting
transition 𝑠𝑠
𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑠𝑑 with 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝜋 for some path 𝜋 ∈ F has 𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑠 , or,
(b) the transition appears in paths in F and the following holds for every corresponding
reacting transition 𝑠𝑠
𝑅 (e)−−−→ 𝑠𝑑 where 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝜋 for some 𝜋 ∈ F and 𝑠𝑑 ∉ 𝜋 for any 𝜋 ∈ F :
either (i) there exists a transition 𝑠𝑠
𝜖−→ 𝑠 ′
𝑑
with 𝑠 ′
𝑑
∈ 𝑝 for some 𝑝 ∈ F , or (ii) all paths out
of 𝑠𝑑 lead back to a state 𝑠𝑓 in a path in F and are independent between 𝑠𝑑 and 𝑠𝑓 .
We call a pair ⟨𝑃, 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛)⟩ consisting of a phase-compatibleMercury process 𝑃 and a permissible
safety specification 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) cutoff-amenable.
Lemma 4.7. For a cutoff-amenable pair ⟨𝑃, 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛)⟩, 𝑐 =𝑚 is a valid cutoff for the parameterized
verification problem in Def. 4.1.
Proof Intuition. We utilize cutoff results from the GSP model [37]. Using the construction in the
proof of Theorem 4.4 to obtain a process 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 in the GSP model from a process 𝑃Merc in Mercury,
we show that if cutoff-amenability holds for 𝑃Merc, then 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 will be cutoff-amenable as defined in
[37] and the resulting cutoff for ⟨𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛)⟩ is also a cutoff for ⟨𝑃Merc, 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛)⟩. Our conditions
are similar in structure to those presented in [37], so the proof follows naturally. We refer the
reader to Appendix B.4 for the full proof.
Extensions. Theorem 4.4 and Lemma 4.7 also hold for a more general form of permissible safety
specifications (see Appendix B.4) and for a certain relaxation of the finite-state requirement (see
Appendix B.5).
5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the implementation of our tool, QuickSilver, for automated
parameterized verification of Mercury programs.QuickSilver rewrites user-providedMercury
programs into the core fragment described in Sec. 3.2, then checks the phase-compatibility and
cutoff-amenability conditions, and finally produces input for our extension of the finite-state verifier
Kinara [2]. We then evaluateQuickSilver’s performance on various benchmarks.
5.1 Implementation
QuickSilver proceeds in three steps, described below.
1. Parsing.QuickSilver uses a parser generated by ANTLR [57] to compileMercury processes
(Fig. 5) into an intermediate representation. QuickSilver additionally rewrites all non-core
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: October 2020.
:24 N. Jaber, C. Wagner, S. Jacobs, M. Kulkarni, and R. Samanta
handlers (e.g., handlers with if-statements or multiple send statements) into (a set of) core
handlers, and, desugars passive handlers and reply reactions.
2. Analysis. From the core fragment of Mercury,QuickSilver creates a labeled graph representing
the process-level semantics (see Sec. 3.2). The phase-compatibility conditions (Def. 4.3) as well as
the cutoff-amenability conditions (Def. 4.6) are checked against this graph, and if the conditions
are met,QuickSilver computes a cutoff to verify the system.
3. Verification.QuickSilver’s verification engine is built on top of Kinara [2], a verification and
synthesis tool for distributed systems with a fixed number of processes.QuickSilver extends
Kinara to support the Partition and ValueCons (Sec. 3.1) primitives as well as their global
behaviors (Sec. 3.3).QuickSilver translates the core fragment of Mercury into the input repre-
sentation accepted by the extended version of Kinara using the cutoff number of processes, as
computed during the analysis step. For permissible safety specifications 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) (ref. Sec. 4.1),
the programmer provides the value of𝑚 and a Boolean expression 𝑓 . The environment process is
automatically generated to nondeterministically send/receive all environmental communication
actions that theMercury process expects. The specifications as well as the environment process
are translated to Kinara’s representation similarly.QuickSilver reports successful parameter-
ized verification iff Kinara reports successful verification for the system consisting of the cutoff
number of processes.
Feedback. If QuickSilver fails at any stage, it gives descriptive feedback to the user about the
nature of the failure and, in some cases, suggests a fix. More precisely,QuickSilver helps the user
by providing suggestions for ensuring that a process is phase-compatible. For instance, the phase-
compatibility conditions may fail because some acting transition enters a phase where some states
can perform a reacting transition while others cannot. In this case,QuickSilver returns the failing
condition and the phase where the condition failed. QuickSilver then suggests either directly
adding the corresponding reacting transition to states that do not have it, or adding an internal path
to another state in that phase where the reacting transition originates. If aMercury process fails
to meet the cutoff-amenability conditions,QuickSilver displays the violated condition, as well as
the relevant states and transitions to help the designer steer their system to fit the conditions.
5.2 Evaluation
We summarize all our benchmarks (other than SATS and Key-Value Store from Sec. 2.1) and refer
the reader to Appendix C for theMercury process definitions and correctness specifications.
(1) Chubby: Chubby [9] is a distributed lock service for coarse-grained synchronization with an
elected leader node that handles client messages.
(2) Distributed Smoke Detector (SD): A sensor network application that elects a subset of processes,
who have detected smoke, to report to the authorities.
(3) Smoke Detector with Reset (SDR): A variant of SD that uses a “reset” signal to resume monitor-
ing for smoke, thereby requiring infinite rounds of agreement.
(4) Distributed Mobile Robotics (DMRs): Based on an existing benchmark [20], where a set of
robots successively coordinate to create a motion plan.
(5) Variant of SATS (SATS++): A variant of the SATS protocol where all processes communicate
explicitly to build a participant set.
All experiments were performed on an Intel core i7 machine with 8GB of RAM.
Performance. In Table 1, for each benchmark we provide the number of handlers in theMercury
process definition, the number of generated handlers in the core fragment inMercury, the number
of lines of code for both the originalMercury process and the final translated input for Kinara, the
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Table 1. QuickSilver performance.
Benchmark Mercury Core Mercury Kinara #Phases Cutoff TotalHandlers Handlers LoC LoC Time(s)
Chubby 16 17 50 148 2 2 0.283
SD 13 20 48 181 4 3 0.389
SDR 12 19 54 193 3 3 0.48
DMR 16 25 63 188 5 2 0.28
KVS 5 9 29 155 1 2 0.444
SATS 17 54 79 284 3 5 19.962
SATS++ 24 61 91 334 3 5 306.708
number of phases, the cutoff used for verification, and the total execution time of QuickSilver.
QuickSilver performs efficient parameterized verification for all benchmarks, taking less than a
second to verify most benchmarks, and about 5 minutes for the most complex benchmark, SATS++.
Ensuring phase-compatibility of Mercury processes. Given the intricacy of the phase-compatibility
conditions, it may not be easy for a system designer to ensure that aMercury process is phase-
compatible. As described in Sec. 5.1, we have included descriptive feedback to explain counterexam-
ples to phase-compatibility and guide the designer toward a phase-compatible process. For example,
when implementing the Chubby benchmark, we made an assumption that a portion of the state
space may only contain a single process at a time (the leader), leading us to omit receive transitions
on some globally-synchronizing actions. Such assumptions rely on structural information to which
our phase-compatibility conditions are oblivious, so our first design was not phase-compatible.
However, the feedback provided byQuickSilver helped identify the missing transitions.
6 RELATEDWORK
Automated, Non-Parameterized Verification. A large body of work focuses on automated veri-
fication and even synthesis of distributed systems with a fixed number of finite-state processes [1–
3, 17, 47, 72]. In these approaches, agreement-based systems can, in principle, be modeled explicitly
by including the internals of agreement protocols. However, automated reasoning over the result-
ing models is unlikely to scale due to the complexity of agreement protocols. Additionally, such
approaches are not sufficient since they only provide guarantees for fixed size systems.
Semi-Automated Parameterized Verification. There is also a large body of work on semi-
automated, deductive verification of distributed protocols and implementations that expects a
user to specify inductive invariants [21, 56, 59, 63, 69–71]. Some approaches [5, 16, 54, 55, 66]
enable more (but not full) automation by translating the user-provided system and inductive invari-
ants into a decidable fragment of first-order logic (e.g., effectively propositional logic (EPR) [58])
or a model with a semi-automatic verification procedure (e.g., the Heard-Of model [13]). Recent
work [42, 67] proposes the use of Lipton’s reduction [46] to reduce reasoning about asynchronous
programs to synchronous and sequential programs, respectively, thereby greatly simplifying the
invariants needed for deductive verification. These approaches based on deductive verification are
typically more expressive, allow for compositional reasoning, and are continually striving for more
automation. Our approach is complementary to these approaches by targeting fully-automated
parameterized verification and using simple abstractions for agreement protocols to push the
boundaries of expressivity and scalability in this domain.
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Decidable Fragments and Cutoff Results for Parameterized Verification. Prior work on the
parameterized verification problem aims to characterize decidable fragments based on restrictions
on the communication primitives, properties, and structure of the system [4, 6, 19, 24, 31, 33, 37].
To enable efficient parameterized verification, prior work additionally identifies cutoff results for
various classes of systems, e.g., cache coherence protocols [25], guarded protocols [24, 26, 38],
consensus protocols [51], and self-stabilizing systems [8]. Unfortunately, these cutoff results do not
extend to systems with agreement primitives. We discuss the GSP model, which we use to prove
decidability, in more detail.
The GSP model. Recently, Jaber et al. [37] proposed the GSP model that generalizes most of the
existing synchronization-based models in the literature. The GSP model supports global transitions
that synchronize all processes. Such transitions are equipped with user-provided guards that identify
a subset of the local state space where all processes must be for the transition to be enabled. They
identify a decidable fragment as well as a fragment with small cutoffs. While the GSPmodel does not
support PID-based communication and local variables, we show that the Partition and ValueCons
primitives can be modeled in the GSP model, and that phase-compatibleMercury programs can be
abstracted to processes in the GSP model that fall in their decidable fragment. The results in [37]
are purely theoretical and processes have to be specified as low-level state-transition systems. In
contrast, our framework provides a modeling language and a fully-automated implementation for
checking phase-compatibility, cutoff-amenability, and for parameterized verification.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We presented and evaluated a framework,QuickSilver, for modeling and efficient, fully-automated
parameterized verification of systems that build on agreement protocols.
In ongoing work, we are focusing on extendingQuickSilver to handle non-blocking commu-
nication and network failures using “channels” that can buffer or drop messages. We are also
investigating the use of synthesis to help system designers enforce phase-compatibility and cutoff-
amenability conditions in process definitions.
Next, we plan to investigate restrictions on the system model that can enable support of liveness
properties. Finally, in order to further support systems with local variables whose domains grow
with the system size, |I𝑛 |, we intend to explore the use of a standard data abstraction (e.g., [41])
over the variables’ domains to bound the size of the local state space.
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A SYMMETRY FOR PARAMETERIZED CORRECTNESS
Since parameterized systems are designed to work for an arbitrary number of processes, their
behaviors should be independent of a specific PID (as such PID may not even exist in every
instantiation of the system). As a result, such parameterized systems naturally exhibit many similar
global behaviors. In this section, we define the notion of full symmetry, how to check if a system is
fully-symmetric , and the effect of full symmetry on verification.
A.1 Symmetry Reduction in the Basic Model
Full Symmetry. Let 𝜋 : {1, . . . , 𝑛} → {1, . . . , 𝑛} be a permutation acting on the set I𝑛 of process
indices. Let 𝑃𝐺 denote the set of all permutations over I𝑛 . A permutation of a global state 𝑞 =
(𝑠0, 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛) can then be defined as:𝜋 (𝑞) = (𝜋 (𝑠0), 𝜋 (𝑠1), . . . , 𝜋 (𝑠𝑛)), where𝜋 (𝑠𝑖 ) = (loc𝜋 (𝑖) , 𝜋 (𝜎𝑖 ))
for 𝑠𝑖 = (loc𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖 ). Note that 𝜋 (𝜎𝑖 ) depends on the type of the local variable being permuted: if it is
of type I𝑛 , then 𝜋 (𝜎𝑖 ) = 𝜎𝜋 (𝑖) , otherwise 𝜋 (𝜎𝑖 ) = 𝜎𝑖 7.
Definition A.1 ([29, 68]). A global transition systemM composed of identical processes with
index set I𝑛 is fully-symmetric if its transition relation 𝑅 is invariant under permutations in 𝑃𝐺 :
∀𝜋 ∈ 𝑃𝐺 : 𝜋 (𝑅) = 𝑅, where 𝜋 (𝑅) = {(𝜋 (𝑞1), 𝜋 (𝑞2)) : (𝑞1, 𝑞2) ∈ 𝑅}.
Mercury syntax enforces sufficient syntactic constraints on manipulation of PIDs to ensure
full symmetry. Such constraints are similar to these in [29, 30, 68] where they prove that limiting
predicates over PIDs to equality and diseqality checks yields full-symmetry ofM.
Verification Advantages of Full Symmetry. Emerson and Sistla [28] show that it is possible to
exploit the symmetries present in a global transition systemM (of a system with many similar
processes) to improve scalability of model checking by constructing a compressed quotient structure
M such thatM |= 𝜙 ⇐⇒ M |= 𝜙 , where 𝜙 is any (CTL∗) specification. It follows from their result
thatM can be constructed for anyM that is fully-symmetric and can enable symmetry reduction
for model checking w.r.t. any LTL specification. We refer the interested reader to Emerson and
Sistla [28] for further details.
A.2 Symmetry of Mercury Programs
Since we introduced the agreement primitives Partition and ValueCons, we need to show that full
symmetry is preserved. In a global transition system,Magree = (𝑄,𝑞0, 𝑅) of aMercury program,
let 𝑅agree denote the set of all agreement transitions in 𝑅. LetM = (𝑄,𝑞0, 𝑅 \ 𝑅agree) denote the
global transition system without the agreement transitions ofMagree.
Lemma A.2. IfM is fully-symmetric, thenMagree is fully-symmetric.
Proof. Essentially, we need to show that 𝑅agree is also invariant under permutations in 𝑃𝐺 , i.e.,
∀𝜋 ∈ 𝑃𝐺 : (𝑞start, 𝑞Wend) ∈ 𝑅agree : (𝑞start, 𝑞Wend) ∈ 𝑅agree ⇐⇒ (𝜋 (𝑞start), 𝜋 (𝑞Wend)) ∈ 𝑅agree
We first examine ValueCons transitions. Since a ValueCons transition is created between 𝑞start
(that encodes the set of participants pcpt, the desired number of values to agree on 𝑘 , and proposal
variable pVar) and a possible 𝑞Wend (that encodes a winning set of valuesW ∈W∗), we simply need
to show that the generation of such winning sets (i.e., obtainingW∗ from a given pcpt, 𝑘 , and pVar
ref. Sec. 3.3) does not depend on the exact PIDs in pcpt and hence, is invariant under permutations
in 𝑃𝐺 . We distinguish two disjoint subsets of permutations in 𝑃𝐺 : (i) 𝑃𝐺𝑚 = {𝜋 | 𝜋 (pcpt) = pcpt}8
(i.e., permutations preserving the membership of pcpt), and (ii) 𝑃𝐺𝑛 = {𝜋 | 𝜋 (pcpt) ≠ pcpt}.
7In case the variable was of an enumerated type (e.g., set, array, or record) containing values of type I𝑛 , then the permutation
is applied recursively to all elements. If the array has an index type I𝑛 , then we permute the array elements themselves, too.
8The permutation of a set 𝐴 is the set of the permuted elements: 𝜋 (𝐴) = {𝜋 (𝑚) |𝑚 ∈ 𝐴}.
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By the construction steps of ValueCons transitions, we know thatW∗ contains all subsets of
values from participants in pcpt of size 𝑘 . Hence,W∗ is invariant to permutations in 𝑃𝐺𝑚 (i.e.,
∀𝜋𝑚 ∈ 𝑃𝐺𝑚 : 𝜋𝑚 (W∗) = W∗). Since pcpt is also invariant to permutations in 𝑃𝐺𝑚 , we can lift
those observations to states:
∀𝜋𝑚 ∈ 𝑃𝐺𝑚 : (𝑞start, 𝑞Wend) ∈ 𝑅agree ⇐⇒ (𝜋𝑚 (𝑞start), 𝜋𝑚 (𝑞Wend)) ∈ 𝑅agree
For any permutation 𝜋𝑛 ∈ 𝑃𝐺𝑛 we obtain a new global state 𝑞′start = 𝜋𝑛 (𝑞start) encoding the set
pcpt′ = 𝜋𝑛 (pcpt). However, we also have ValueCons transitions out of that state. That is, since
the process definition does not identify a specific set of participants, all valid ValueCons transitions
from 𝑞′start are also in 𝑅agree.
For Partition transitions, the essence of the argument is identical. Since both 𝑅agreeis invariant
under permutations in 𝑃𝐺 , we conclude thatMagree is fully-symmetric. □
B PROOF OF DECIDABILITY
To show that parameterized verification is decidable for phase-compatible programs inMercury,
we will utilize decidability and cutoff results of the GSP model presented by Jaber et. al. [37] by
showing that for each phase-compatible process 𝑃Merc, there exists a corresponding process 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃
in the GSP model such that there exists a simulation equivalence between 𝑃Merc and 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 . We start
by briefly introducing the GSP model, and proceed with the proof of decidability.
B.1 The GSP Model [37]
The GSP model generalizes synchronization-based models including models based on rendezvous
and broadcasts. In the GSP model, each global transition synchronizes all processes, where multiple
processes act as the senders of the transition, while the remaining processes react as receivers.
The model supports two types of transitions: (i) a 𝑘-sender transition, which can fire only if the
number of processes available to act as senders in the transition is at least 𝑘 and is fired with exactly
𝑘 processes acting as senders, and, (ii) a 𝑘-maximal transition, which can fire only if the number
𝑚 of processes available to act as senders is at least one and is fired with 𝑘 processes acting as
senders if𝑚 ≥ 𝑘 , or, with𝑚 processes acting as senders, otherwise. Additionally, each transition
can be equipped with a global guard which identifies a subset of the local state space. A transition
is enabled whenever it can fire and the local states of all processes are in the transition guard.
Processes. A GSP process is defined as 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = ⟨𝐴, 𝑆, 𝑠0,𝑇 ⟩, where 𝐴 is a set of local actions, 𝑆 is a
finite set of states, 𝑠0 ∈ 𝑆 is the initial state, and𝑇 ⊆ 𝑆 ×𝐴× 𝑆 is the transition relation. The set𝐴 of
local actions corresponds to a setA of global actions. Each global action 𝑎 ∈ A has an arity 𝑘 with
local send actions 𝑎1!!, . . . , 𝑎𝑘 !! and a local receive action 𝑎??, and is further associated with either
a 𝑘-sender or a 𝑘-maximal global transition as well as a global guard 𝐺𝑎 ⊆ 𝑆 of the transition.
Composition of Processes. Given a process 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , the parameterized global transition system is
defined asM𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑛) = ⟨𝑄, q0, 𝑅⟩ where 𝑄 = {0, . . . , 𝑛} |𝑆 | is the set of states, q0 is the initial state
and 𝑅 is the global transition relation. Thus, a global state q ∈ 𝑄 is a vector of natural numbers,
representing the number of processes that are in any given local state 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 . The global transition
relation 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑄 × A × 2𝑆 ×𝑄 defines how processes synchronize using a 𝑘-sender or a 𝑘-maximal
transition to move between global states. In a global transition based on a global action 𝑎 ∈ A with
arity 𝑘 , each of the local send actions 𝑎1!!, . . . , 𝑎𝑘 !! is taken by at most one process. A transition
q
𝑎,𝐺𝑎−−−→ q′ based on a 𝑘-sender action is in 𝑅 if (i) the transition is enabled (i.e. all the processes in q
are in the subset of the local state space defined by the transition guard 𝐺𝑎), and (ii) in q, there are
at least 𝑘 senders each taking a local sending transition 𝑠 𝑎𝑖 !!−−→ 𝑠 ′. The remaining processes take
the local transition 𝑠 𝑎??−−→ 𝑠 ′. The global state q′ is obtained by all processes moving accordingly.
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Algorithm 1: Procedure for rewriting a process 𝑃Merc to a process 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
1 procedure Rewrite(𝑃Merc)
Input :𝑃Merc, a phase-compatibleMercury process
Output :𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , a process in the GSP model
2 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = RewriteBroadcastTransitions(𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 )
3 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = RewriteRendezvousAndInternalTransitions(𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 )
4 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = RewritePartitionTransitions(𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 )
5 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = RewriteValueConsTransitions(𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 )
6 return 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃
Transitions q 𝑎,𝐺𝑎−−−→ q′ based on a 𝑘-maximal action behave similarly, except that at least one (instead
of 𝑘) sender is required, and q′ is obtained by maximizing (up to 𝑘) the number of processes that
can act as senders.
Parameterized Verification in the GSP Model. Jaber et al. [37] define a set of well-behavedness
conditions over the process definition 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 to ensure decidability of parameterized verification; the
decidability result itself is based on a reduction to a well-structured transition system (WSTS) [32].
B.2 Simulation Equivalence
We now present a mapping procedure (Rewrite) in Algo. 1 and show that there exists a simulation
equivalence between a phase-compatible process 𝑃Merc and the corresponding 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 =Rewrite(𝑃Merc).
The rewriting procedure consists of a series of rewriting steps in which the semantics of each type
of transition of aMercury program is converted into (a set of) transitions in the GSP model.
Recall that the set 𝑆 represents the local state space of 𝑃Merc. We start with a processes definition,
𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , in the GSP model whose local states are 𝑆 .
InMMerc, a global state 𝑞Merc ∈ 𝑄Merc of the form 𝑆𝑛 is a concatenation of the local states of all
processes. In theM𝐺𝑆𝑃 , a global state q𝐺𝑆𝑃 ∈ 𝑄𝐺𝑆𝑃 of the form N |𝑆 | is a counter representation
recording how many processes are in a given local state. Below, we provide an abstraction function
that maps the global state space ofMMerc to the global state space ofM𝐺𝑆𝑃 . We define the function
𝛼 : 𝑄Merc → 𝑄𝐺𝑆𝑃 as follows:
q𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑠) =
∑︁
𝑠𝑖 ∈𝑞Merc
1(𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠),
where 1(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑) evaluates to 1 if 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 is true and 0 otherwise. The function counts the local states
in 𝑞Merc and encodes that into the counter representation in q𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
B.2.1 RewriteBroadcastTransitions. Jaber et. al. [37] describe how broadcasts can be sup-
ported in the GSPmodel as 1-sender transitions. Consider an arbitrary broadcast action act. For each
broadcast send transition 𝑠
sendbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃Merc, we create a 1-sender transition 𝑠 act1!!,𝑠𝑟𝑐act−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′
in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , and for each broadcast receive transition 𝑠
recvbr(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃Merc, we create a receiving
transition 𝑠 act??,𝑠𝑟𝑐act−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 . Recall that 𝑠𝑟𝑐act is the source set of action act. We add the
guard 𝑠𝑟𝑐act to ensure that the broadcast primitives have similar semantics. Hence, it is not hard to
see that the following correspondence holds:
Lemma B.1. Let act be a broadcast action, and let 𝐺 be a guard for act obtained by the Rewrite-
BroadcastTransitions procedure described above. Then,
∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝑞1 act−−→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc ⇐⇒ 𝛼 (𝑞1) act,𝐺−−−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
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B.2.2 RewriteRendezvousAndInternalTransitions. Jaber et. al. [37] also describe how internal
and rendezvous transitions can be supported in the GSP model using 1- and 2-sender actions,
respectively.We replace each internal transition 𝑠 𝜖−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃Merc with a 1-sender transition 𝑠 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 (𝑠)−−−−−−→
𝑠 ′ in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , where 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 (𝑠) is the union of all phases that contain the state 𝑠 . We also replace
rendezvous transitions 𝑠
sendrz(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ and 𝑠 recvrz(act)−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′with 2-sender transitions 𝑠 act1!!,𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 (𝑠)−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑠 ′ andin 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 with 𝑠
act2!!,𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 (𝑠)−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′. While rendezvous and internal transitions do not coordinate
with other processes, transitions in the GSP model are assumed to synchronize with all processes.
As such, we create guards on these transitions based on phases, as we can be sure that if a process
is in a phase to take such a transition, no process will be outside the phase. No feasible behaviors
are removed. Based on the simple translation from internal and rendezvous messages given above,
the following correspondence between the global transitions based on those primitive holds:
∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝑞1 act−−→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc =⇒ 𝛼 (𝑞1) act−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃 , (1)
where, act is a rendezvous or an internal action. Note that, for rendezvous transitions, we still need
to show that the other direction holds. Since the GSP model does not support process indices, a
global transition based on rendezvous communications inMercury programs between, say, process
𝑝1 in state 𝑠1 and process 𝑝2 in state 𝑠2 would correspond to a 2-sender transition involving any
process in 𝑠1 and any process in 𝑠2. However, because 𝑃Merc is phase-compatible, the PID-based
communications are equivalent to the communication actions without PIDs in the GSP model.
Rendezvous Transitions under Full Symmetry. Recall thatMercury syntax (ref. Fig. 5) imposes
syntactic constraints on how expressions of type I𝑛 can be used. Essentially, the only expres-
sions allowed are equality checks. These constraints ensure that the send statement sendrz(act,
⟨optIntVar⟩,⟨idExp⟩) (corresponding to the local send transition (loc, 𝜎) sendrz(act,𝑃𝐼𝐷)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′))
cannot be instantiated with a specific, concrete PID. This PID-independent behavior ensures that,
if there exists a transition (loc, 𝜎) sendrz(act,𝑖)−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′) for some 𝑖 ∈ I𝑛 , then there exists a
transition (loc, 𝜎 [𝑖 ← 𝑗]) sendrz(act, 𝑗)−−−−−−−−−−→ (loc′, 𝜎 ′[𝑖 ← 𝑗]) for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 ∈ I𝑛 . Hence, if a global
transition 𝑞1
act−−→ 𝑞2 based on a rendezvous action act between processes 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃 𝑗 exists inMMerc,
then ∀𝜋 ∈ 𝑃𝐺. 𝜋 (𝑞1) act−−→ 𝜋 (𝑞2) between processes 𝑃𝜋 (𝑖) and 𝑃𝜋 ( 𝑗) also exists inMMerc.
Lemma B.2. Let act be an rendezvous action and 𝑃Merc be a phase-compatible process. Then,
∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝛼 (𝑞1) act−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃 =⇒ 𝑞1 act−−→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc.
Proof. Since permuting a global state of Mercury programs does not change the local state of a
process but just its PID, we know that: ∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc if 𝑞1 = 𝜋 (𝑞2) for some 𝜋 ∈ 𝑃𝐺 then 𝛼 (𝑞1) =
𝛼 (𝑞2) (since the abstraction function 𝛼 only captures the local state space, but not the indices). Since
𝑃Merc is phase-compatible, we know that there exists at most one rendezvous-receive transition per
action per phase. Under full symmetry, this condition ensures that abstracting the receiver PID (in
a rendezvous-send transition 𝑠
sendrz(act,𝑃𝐼𝐷)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′) does not introduce spurious behaviors. It then
follows that: ∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝛼 (𝑞1) act−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃 =⇒ 𝑞1 act−−→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc. □
By Lemma B.2 and property (1) above, we obtain the following result:
Lemma B.3. Let act be an rendezvous action and 𝑃Merc be a phase-compatible process. Then,
∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝛼 (𝑞1) act−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃 ⇐⇒ 𝑞1 act−−→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc.
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B.2.3 RewriteValueConsTransitions. We show how 𝑘-sender actions in [37] are used to model
ValueCons agreement. Consider a ValueCons instance cons in 𝑃Merc. Let pVar have the domain
𝑉 . Let𝑊 = {𝑤1, . . . ,𝑤𝑚} be the set of all sets constructed from elements in 𝑉 with size between
1 and 𝑘 (inclusive). Also, for each 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑠𝑟𝑐cons, let 𝑓𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 denote the local state into which each
participant in 𝑠𝑖 transitions after 𝑙 ends, for a given set of winning values𝑤 𝑗 ∈𝑊 . For each such
𝑤 𝑗 , create a 𝑘-sender 𝑎 𝑗 action as follows:
– create a transition 𝑠𝑖
𝑎 𝑗 ??,𝑠𝑟𝑐cons−−−−−−−−→ 𝑓𝑖, 𝑗 in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , and,
– create for each element 𝑒 ∈ 𝑤 𝑗 a new local-send action 𝑎 𝑗,𝑒 !!, and for each 𝑠𝑖 such that 𝑠𝑖 .𝜎 (𝑣) = 𝑒 ,
create a transition 𝑠𝑖
𝑎 𝑗,𝑒!!,𝑠𝑟𝑐cons−−−−−−−−→ 𝑓𝑖, 𝑗 to 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
B.2.4 RewritePartitionTransitions. We show how 𝑘-maximal actions in [37] are used to
model Partition agreement. Consider a Partition instance part in 𝑃Merc. For the win transition
𝑠
win:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃Merc, we create the transitions 𝑠
𝑎𝑖 !!,𝑠𝑟𝑐part−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ ∀𝑖 ∈ {1 . . . 𝑘} in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 , where
𝑎 is a 𝑘-maximal action. Similarly, for each 𝑠
win:𝑃𝐶part (pcpt,𝑘)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃Merc we create the receive
transition 𝑠
𝑎??,𝑠𝑟𝑐part−−−−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
We show that the RewritePartitionTransitions and RewriteValueConsTransitions proce-
dures described above yield an equivalence between agreement transitions and the corresponding
𝑘-sender and 𝑘-maximal transitions used to model them.
Lemma B.4. Let 𝑞1 −→ 𝑞2 be an Partition agreement transition with cardinality 𝑘 , 𝑏 be a 𝑘-
maximal action, and 𝐺 be a global guard built as described by the RewritePartitionTransitions
in Algo. 1. Then, ∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝑞1 −→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc ⇐⇒ 𝛼 (𝑞1) 𝑏,𝐺−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃
Proof. The semantics of the agreement transition in Mercury is to pick up to a total of 𝑘
winning participating processes from multiple possible start states {𝑐1, . . . , 𝑐𝑚} and switch their
states to the corresponding winning states {𝑤1, . . . ,𝑤𝑚} while all the other participating processes
move to the corresponding losing states {𝑙1, . . . , 𝑙𝑚}.
A 𝑘-maximal transition in the GSP model behaves similar to a agreement transition by moving
𝑘 processes from their respective 𝑐𝑖 states to a winning state 𝑤𝑖 and all the other processes to a
losing state 𝑙𝑖 . Since we create a 𝑘-maximal transition with the same number of winning’ send
transitions for each starting start 𝑐𝑖 , winning processes may be arbitrarily distributed among the
starting states, similar to the correspondingMercury transition. In both models, the rest of the
processes move to the losing states.
Hence, the semantics of 𝑘-maximal transitions enforces the Consistent Winners post condition of
the corresponding agreement transition. The guard𝐺 ensures that the broadcast is only enabled
when all the processes participating in the agreement round are in the right states, hence, ensuring
the Consistent Participants precondition. Since the guard 𝐺 is a set of local states, it is invariant to
the abstraction function 𝛼 (i.e. 𝐺 is enabled in 𝑞 iff it is enabled in 𝛼 (𝑞)). □
Lemma B.5. Let 𝑞1 −→ 𝑞2 be a ValueCons transition with cardinality 𝑘 , 𝑏 be a 𝑘-sender transition,
and𝐺 be a global guard built as described by the RewriteValueConsTransitions in Algo. 1. Then,
∀𝑞1, 𝑞2 ∈ 𝑄Merc : 𝑞1 −→ 𝑞2 ∈ MMerc ⇐⇒ 𝛼 (𝑞1) 𝑏,𝐺−−→ 𝛼 (𝑞2) ∈ M𝐺𝑆𝑃
Proof. The semantics of the agreement transition inMercury is to pick up to 𝑘 winning values
proposed by the participating processes starting from multiple possible start states {𝑐1, . . . , 𝑐𝑚} and
switch the processes’ states to the corresponding next states where agreement is reached on a set
of 1 to 𝑘 values.
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By construction, each ValueCons transition is simulated by at least one 𝑘-sender transition that
guarantees agreement on a given set of winning values. The semantics of the generated 𝑘-sender
transition ensures that it is only enabled when there exists at least one participant proposing each
value of the set of winning values. This is achieved by placing the local-send transitions from each
state 𝑠 with 𝑠 .𝜎 (𝑣) ∈ 𝑤 , where𝑤 is the winning set. As in Lemma B.4, the guard𝐺 ensures that the
transition is only enabled in a state satisfying Consistent Participants precondition. □
Simulation Equivalence ofMMerc andM𝐺𝑆𝑃 . Based on Lemmas B.1 - B.5, we obtain the fol-
lowing theorem:
Theorem B.6. Given a phase-compatible 𝑃Merc, 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc), the respective global
transition systemsMMerc (𝑛),M𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑛), and permissible specification 𝜙 , we have:
∀𝑛. M𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑛) |= 𝜙 ⇐⇒ MMerc (𝑛) |= 𝜙.
B.3 Proof of Decidability
We now show that, for any phase-compatible process 𝑃Merc, the parameterized verification of 𝑃Merc
for a permissible specification 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) is decidable. We show that 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc) falls
within the decidable fragment of the GSP model defined by the authors of [37].
First, we define a condition over GSP model processes which generalizes the conditions for weak
guard compatibility which [37] identifies. For a 𝑘-sender or 𝑘-maximal action 𝑎, let 𝑠 be the set of
states 𝑠𝑖 such that 𝑠𝑖
𝑎𝑖 !!,𝐺−−−−→ 𝑠 ′𝑖 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 , are the local sending transitions, 𝑠 ′ the set of all states 𝑠 ′𝑖 ,
and𝑀𝑎 (𝑠𝑘 ) denote the state 𝑠𝑙 that 𝑠𝑘 is mapped to in a transition 𝑠𝑘 𝑎??−−→ 𝑠𝑙 . We say that action 𝑎 is
weakly guard-compatible if the following holds for all 𝐺 ′ ∈ G, the set of all guards in the system :
∀𝐺 ′. (𝑠 ′ ∩𝐺 ′ = ∅) ∨ (𝑠 ′ ⊆ 𝐺 ′ ∧ ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝐺. ∃𝑡 ∈ 𝐺 ′. 𝑀𝑎 (𝑠) ⇝ 𝑡). (wellBehaved)
where𝑀𝑎 (𝑠) ⇝ 𝑡 represents that the receiver must have an unguarded path of internal transitions
to the state 𝑡 from𝑀𝑎 (𝑠). Informally, this condition requires that all senders of a transition must
end outside of a guard together, or all processes must end inside the guard. We point out that this
condition implies all of the conditions presented in the decidable fragment of the GSP model.
Claim: ∀ 𝑃Merc . phase-compatible(𝑃Merc) → wellBehaved(𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 ), where 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc).
Proof: This will be a proof by contradiction. Assumption: ∃ 𝑃Merc . phase-compatible(𝑃Merc) ∧
¬wellBehaved(𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 ). More specifically, the following must be true for 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc).
∃ 𝐺 ′. (𝑠 ′ ∩𝐺 ′ ≠ ∅) ∧ (𝑠 ′ ⊈ 𝐺 ′ ∨ ∃ 𝑠 ∈ 𝐺. ¬(∃ 𝑡 ∈ 𝐺 ′. 𝑀𝑎 (𝑠) ⇝ 𝑡)) .
That is, for some guard𝐺 ′ and action e with source states 𝑠 and destination states 𝑠 ′, some acting
transition on e ends in𝐺 ′ and either another acting transition on e ends outside of𝐺 ′, or a receiver
cannot reach 𝐺 ′.
Globally-Synchronizing Actions. Consider the case in which e is a globally-synchronizing action.
In the scenario where some acting transition ends outside 𝐺 ′, we examine the two possibilities
under which the guard 𝐺 ′ may have been created.
(1) If𝐺 ′ is 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑏 for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐸global ., we have a contradiction, because phase-compatible(𝑃Merc)
ensures that if an acting transition of a globally-synchronizing action (e.g., e) ends in a state
with an outgoing reacting action (e.g., 𝑏), then all other acting transitions of e must end in a
state with an outgoing receive action 𝑏, which is in 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑏 .
(2) If 𝐺 ′ is the guard of an internal or pairwise transition (i.e. some 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒), then the destination
of the acting transition which ends in 𝐺 ′ must be in that 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 . Since any two states in 𝑑𝑠𝑡e
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must necessarily be in the same phase, all acting transitions on emust end in the same phase,
contradicting our assumption that one of them ends outside of 𝐺 ′.
We proved that acting transitions must end in 𝐺 ′ if any of them does. Now, consider the scenario
where the acting transitions end inside 𝐺 ′ but some reacting transition cannot reach 𝐺 ′ (via some
path of unguarded internal transitions). We again examine the two creation scenarios of 𝐺 ′.
(1) If𝐺 ′ is 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑏 for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐸global, we have a contradiction since our restriction on reacting ac-
tions imposed by phase-compatible(𝑃Merc) ensures that the reacting transition’s destination
state must be able to reach a source state of 𝑏.
(2) If 𝐺 ′ is the guard of an internal or pairwise transition (i.e. some 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒), then 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡e ⊆ 𝐺 ′,
because the acting transitions end in 𝐺 ′, which is equal to the phase. Since all reacting
transitions on e also end in 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡e, and 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡e is necessarily a subset of the phase, all reacting
transitions on e end in 𝐺 ′, contradicting with our assumption that one of them does not.
Thus, globally-synchronizing actions in 𝑃Merc map to guard-compatible actions in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
Internal. Consider the case in which e is an internal action. This is a transition in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 with only
one sending transition, so there must be some self-looping receive transition which cannot reach
𝐺 ′. This requires that, for 𝐺 (the guard on the internal transition), 𝐺 ≠ 𝐺 ′. We consider the two
possibilities under which the guard 𝐺 ′ may have been created.
(1) If 𝐺 ′ is 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑏 for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐸global, then the state of the self-looping receive transition (which
is in 𝐺) must not have a path of internal transitions to reach a source state of 𝑏. However,
this contradicts our restriction on internal actions imposed by phase-compatible(𝑃Merc).
(2) If 𝐺 ′ is the guard of an internal or pairwise transition (i.e. some 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒), then the state of
the self-looping receive transition (a state in 𝐺 , which is also a phase) must not have a path
of internal transitions to reach 𝐺 ′. However, the sender begins in 𝐺 and ends in 𝐺 ′, so by
our definition of phases, 𝐺 and 𝐺 ′ would be merged, so 𝐺 = 𝐺 ′, and no such self-looping
transition can exist. So, we have a contradiction.
Thus, internal actions in 𝑃Merc map to guard-compatible actions in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
Rendezvous. Consider the case in which e is a rendezvous action. There are two senders, so
one sender must end in some guard 𝐺 ′ and either the other sender must end outside of 𝐺 ′, or
some receiver must not be able to reach 𝐺 ′. Considering the scenario where some sender (i.e. the
rendezvous sender or receiver) ends outside 𝐺 ′, we consider the two creation scenarios of 𝐺 ′.
(1) If𝐺 ′ is 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑏 for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐸global, we have a contradiction, because phase-compatible(𝑃Merc)
ensures that if either the rendezvous sender or receiver ends in a state where there is a
globally-synchronizing reacting transition on 𝑏, then the other must also be able to reach it.
(2) If 𝐺 ′ is the guard of an internal or pairwise transition (i.e. some 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒), we also have a
contradiction, because all source and destination states of a rendezvous action will be in the
same phase.
Now that we know the senders of the 2-sender action must both end in 𝐺 ′ if either of them does,
consider the scenario where some self-looping receiver ends outside 𝐺 ′. We consider the two
creation scenarios of 𝐺 ′.
(1) If 𝐺 ′ is 𝑠𝑟𝑐𝑏 for some 𝑏 ∈ 𝐸global, then the state of the self-looping receive transition (which
is in 𝐺) must not have a path of internal transitions to reach a source state of 𝑏.However,
phase-compatible(𝑃Merc) ensures that this is not the case, so we have a contradiction.
(2) If 𝐺 ′ is the guard of an internal or pairwise transition (i.e. some 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒), then the assumption
requires that the state of the self-looping receive transition (which is in 𝐺) must not have a
path of internal transitions to reach 𝐺 ′. However, both senders begin in 𝐺 and ends in 𝐺 ′, so
by our definition of phases, 𝐺 and 𝐺 ′ would be merged, so 𝐺 = 𝐺 ′, and no such self-looping
transition can exist. So, we have a contradiction.
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Thus, rendezvous actions in 𝑃Merc map to guard-compatible actions in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
Since all transitions in the transitions in 𝑃Merc map to guard-compatible transitions in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 ,
𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 is well-behaved, contradicting the assumption. □
B.4 Proof of Cutoff Results
We now show that, for any cutoff-amenable process 𝑃Merc and permissible specification 𝜙 𝑓 ,𝑚 (𝑛)
has a cutoff 𝑐 = 𝑚. We show that when any such cutoff-amenable process 𝑃Merc is mapped to
𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc) that is guaranteed to have the cutoff 𝑐 = 𝑚 according to the cutoff
Lemma B.7 presented in [37].
Cutoff Results in the GSP model.The authors of [37] define a transition of a GSP model process
𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 to be free if it is (i) an internal transition, (ii) a sending transition of either a broadcast (i.e., a
1-sender action) or a 𝑘-maximal action, or (iii) a receiving transition 𝑠 𝑎??,𝐺−−−−→ 𝑠 ′ of a broadcast with
matching sending transition 𝑠 𝑎!!,𝐺−−−→ 𝑠 ′. A path from one state to another is free if all transitions on
the path are free.
The authors of [37] present the following characterization of a GSP model process which has
small cutoffs.
Lemma B.7 ([37]). Let 𝑃 = ⟨𝐴, 𝑆, 𝑠0,𝑇 ⟩ be a well-behaved GSP process, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 , 𝜙𝑚 (𝑠) a permissible
specification, and let F𝐺𝑆𝑃 be the set of simple free paths from 𝑠0 to 𝑠 . If all paths from 𝑠0 to 𝑠 are free,
or for each send transition:
(1) the transition does not appear in paths in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and the corresponding receiving transitions
𝑠𝑠
𝑎??,𝐺𝑎−−−−→ 𝑠𝑑 with 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑝 for some 𝑝 ∈ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 have 𝑠𝑑 = 𝑠𝑠 , or,
(2) the transition appears in paths in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and the following holds for every corresponding receive
transition 𝑠𝑠
𝑎??,𝐺𝑎−−−−→ 𝑠𝑑 where 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑝 for some 𝑝 ∈ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and 𝑠𝑑 ∉ 𝑝 for any 𝑝 ∈ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 : either (a)
there exists an internal transition 𝑠𝑠
𝜖−→ 𝑠 ′
𝑑
with 𝑠 ′
𝑑
∈ 𝑝 for some 𝑝 ∈ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 , or (b) all paths out of
𝑠𝑑 lead back to a state 𝑠𝑓 in a path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and are free between 𝑠𝑑 and 𝑠𝑓 .
then 𝑐 =𝑚 is a cutoff.
CutoffResults Proof.Note that the cutoff-amenability conditions (ref. Def. 4.6) assume permissible
specifications of the form 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛). In order to make the proof more accessible, we assume the
existence of a state 𝑠 such that each local states in 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓 ) has an internal transition to 𝑠 . We
write Cutoff Merc (𝑃Merc) to denote 𝑃Merc satisfies the cutoff-amenability conditions (ref. Def. 4.6)
and Cutoff 𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 ) to denote that Lemma B.7 holds for a GSP process 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 . We now show that
if a process 𝑃Merc satisfies the conditions defined by Def. 4.6, then the corresponding 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 satisfies
Cutoff 𝐺𝑆𝑃 , and thus 𝑃Merc has cutoff 𝑐 =𝑚.
Claim: Cutoff Merc (𝑃Merc) → Cutoff 𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 ), where 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc).
Proof: This will be a proof by contradiction. First, we assume our claim does not hold.
Assumption: Cutoff Merc (𝑃Merc) ∧ ¬Cutoff 𝐺𝑆𝑃 (𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 ).
In order for the conditions of Lemma B.7 to not hold, there must exist a path from 𝑠0 to 𝑠 which
is not free, and there must exist an acting transition where:
(D1) there exists a send transition which is not part of a path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 (simple, free paths), and
there exists some receive of that transition which has an origin state in some path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃
and transitions to a state other than its origin state (does not self-loop), or
(D2) there exists a receive transition 𝑠𝑠 −→ 𝑠𝑑 starting on a free path (𝑠𝑠 ∈ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 ) and leaves it
(𝑠𝑑 ∉ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 ) and there does not exist an internal transition that skips the receive, and either
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(a) there are no paths out of 𝑠𝑑 , or
(b) there exists a path from 𝑠𝑑 that either (i) does not lead back to a free path, or (ii) does lead
back to a path p in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and is not free between 𝑠𝑑 and p.
In the case where all paths from 𝑠0 to 𝑠 are independent, there must be some independent transition
in 𝑃Merc which maps to a transition which is not free. This transition must be an acting ValueCons
transition, because winning Partition, broadcast send, and internal transitions all map directly to
free transitions. In the case where the cardinality 𝑘 is 1, such a transition maps to a broadcast send
transition 𝑡 , as well as a corresponding receive 𝑢, which are free transitions because they form
a negotiation. The transition also maps to other broadcast receive transitions corresponding to
sends from other states where the decided value is the same as that of 𝑡 . Since taking any of these
receive transitions is semantically indistinguishable from taking the 𝑢 transition, we consider these
additional receives to be part of the negotiation and thus are equally free. As such, all independent
transitions map to free transitions, so all paths in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 are free if all paths in FMerc are independent.
Thus, we arrive at a contradiction, because all paths from 𝑠0 to 𝑠 are independent, so there cannot
be a path from 𝑠0 to 𝑠 which is not free.
In case (D1) does not hold, we must explore (D2). If part (a) holds, then there must exists a send
transition which is not part of a path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 , and there must exist a receive of that transition which
begins in a path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and transitions to a state other than its origin state (does not self-loop).
We examine the different transition types in 𝑃Merc which may map to this send and receive.
(i) If the send is part of a rendezvous or internal choose transition, we have a contradiction,
because all receives of these transitions must self-loop.
(ii) Consider send transitions rewritten from a broadcast or a Partition transition in 𝑃Merc. Since
every such transition is outside of F𝐺𝑆𝑃 iff it is outside FMerc (by the nature of our rewrite),
we have a contradiction between the assumption and our cutoff-amenability conditions.
(iii) Consider send transitions rewritten from a ValueCons transition. We arrive at a contradiction
in one of the following ways. If the send transition resulted from an acting value-store transi-
tion outside of FMerc, then our cutoff-amenability conditions require the reacting transitions
to self-loop, reaching a contradiction. On the other hand, if the send transition resulted from a
value-store transition that is in FMerc, then it is strictly in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 contradicting our assumption.
If part (b) of (D2) holds, there must exist a receive transition 𝑠𝑠 −→ 𝑠𝑑 that starts on a free path
(𝑠𝑠 ∈ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 ) and leaves it (𝑠𝑑 ∉ F𝐺𝑆𝑃 ), such that there does not exist an internal transition that “skips”
the receive, and there is no free path back from 𝑠𝑑 to a state in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 . The receive transitions must
be the result of rewriting some transition in 𝑃Merc, so we will examine each of those possibilities.
(i) If the receive is part of a rendezvous or internal transition, we have a contradiction, since all
such receives must self-loop, and cannot begin on a path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and end outside of F𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
(ii) Consider receive transitions rewritten from a reacting broadcast, Partition, or ValueCons
transition in 𝑃Merc. The assumption requires that there does not exist an internal transition
in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 that “skips” the receive, so according to our cutoff-amenability conditions, all paths
out of 𝑠𝑑 must lead back to a state 𝑠𝑓 in a path in FMerc and be independent between 𝑠𝑑 and
𝑠𝑓 , and such a path must exist. Since every state in FMerc is a state in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 (ref. Lemma B.8),
then 𝑠𝑓 is in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 and the path from 𝑠𝑑 to 𝑠𝑓 is free, so we have a contradiction.
Since we arrive at a contradiction on all proof branches, if our restrictions hold on 𝑃Merc, then
the conditions of Lemma B.7 hold on 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
□
While the definitions of FMerc and F𝐺𝑆𝑃 differ, it can be shown that the states they include are
the same. Note that the local state spaces of 𝑃Merc and 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 are the same. Let 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (F ) = {𝑠 ∈ 𝑝 |
𝑝 ∈ F } be the set of states of all the paths in F .
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Lemma B.8. For any 𝑃Merc such that 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 = Rewrite(𝑃Merc), 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (FMerc) = 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (F𝐺𝑆𝑃 ).
Proof. For any path 𝑝 ∈ FMerc, if there are no ValueCons transitions in 𝑝 , then all transitions
in 𝑝 are independent and map to free transitions in 𝑃𝐺𝑆𝑃 . Hence, all states in 𝑝 will be in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 .
Consider a scenario where two sets of free paths 𝑏 and 𝑎 are connected by a value-store transition
𝑡𝑣 . Each path 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝑏 begins at a state 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ) and ends at a state 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ), which is a source state
of 𝑡𝑣 . Each path 𝑎 𝑗 ∈ 𝑎 begins at a destination state of 𝑡𝑣 , 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 (𝑎 𝑗 ), and ends at a state 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑎 𝑗 ).
After rewriting, every source state 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ) of 𝑡𝑣 has a 1-sender broadcast-send transition from
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ) to some 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 (𝑎 𝑗 ), and every destination state 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 (𝑎 𝑗 ) of 𝑡𝑣 is reached by 1-sender
broadcast-send transition from some 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ). Therefore, every 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ) has a free path to some
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑎 𝑗 ) through the 1-sender broadcast-send from 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 (𝑏𝑖 ) to 𝑓 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 (𝑎 𝑗 ), and every source and
destination state of 𝑡𝑣 is on at least one of these free paths.
The paths in FMerc can be viewed as a series of sets of free paths separated by value-store
transitions. So, by applying the above logic repeatedly, we can see that every source and destination
state of every value-store transition in FMerc is, in fact, part of a free path in F𝐺𝑆𝑃 . □
Reachability of Combinations of States. We handle conjunctions and disjunctions of the per-
missible specification 𝜙𝑚,𝑓 (𝑛) as follows. If the safety property is of the form:
𝜙𝑚1,𝑓1 (𝑛) ∧ . . . ∧ 𝜙𝑚 𝑗 ,𝑓𝑗 (𝑛)
for some finite 𝑗 , we compute the cutoff independently for each 𝑗 , and use the maximum cutoff
value to check the correctness of the system. Finally, if the safety property is of the form:
𝜙𝑚1,𝑓1 (𝑛) ∨ . . . ∨ 𝜙𝑚 𝑗 ,𝑓𝑗 (𝑛)
for some finite 𝑗 , we compute cutoff independently for each 𝑗 , and summing the resulting cutoff
values to check the correctness of the system. To ensure that one can compute the cutoffs indepen-
dently, we require the following. For each 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑗], let F𝑖 denote the set of paths from the initial
state 𝑠0 to 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑓𝑖 ). We require that for any two sets of paths F𝑖1 and F𝑖2 there does not exist any
non-internal transition 𝑠 −→ 𝑠 ′ such that 𝑠 ∈ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (F𝑖1 ) and 𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 (F𝑖2 ).
B.5 Relaxing the Finite State Requirement
location Start
on _ do
broadcast(ask)
set.add(self)
goto Collect
on recv(ask) reply rep[1]
location Collect
on recv(rep) do
if(rep.payld == 1)
set.add(rep.sID)
c = c + 1
if(c == n-1)
goto End
location Rec
on recv(ask) do
sendrz(rep[0], ask.sID)
goto Idle
location Idle
on recv(ask) reply rep[0]
location End
on recv(ask) reply rep[1]
(a)
location Start
on _ do
sendbr(ToEnd)
goto End
on ToEnd do
set.add(ToEnd.sID)
goto End
location End
on recv(AllHere) do
set.add(AllHere.sID)
on _ do
set.add(self)
broadcast(AllHere)
(b)
Fig. 10. Structures for Building Participant Sets.
In addition to allowing the set of partic-
ipants of agreement in distributed sys-
tems to be all processes (All) or the result
of a previous Partition instance part
(part.winS or part.loseS), we allow the
following structures to build such sets.
First, a way to build a set of participants
is for each participant to send an inquiry
to all other processes using a broadcast,
and collect the replies from all other 𝑛 − 1
processes on whether they want to par-
ticipate in some agreement instance, as
shown in Fig. 10a. In such scenario, start-
ing at location Start, the processes that
end in location End are participants and
have consistent sets while that those start
in location Rec and end in Idle are non-
participants. Another instance of building
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1 process Chubby
2 actions
3 br stepdown : unit
4 br forward : unit
5 env
6 rz write : unit
7 rz read : unit
8 rz ackWrite : unit
9 rz ackRead : unit
10 rz timeout : unit
11 initial location Candidate
12 on Partition<elect>(All,1)
13 win:
14 goto Leader
15 lose:
16 goto Replica
17 location Replica
18 on recv (forward) do
19 goto Replica
20 on recv (stepdown) do
21 goto Candidate
22 location Leader
23 on recv (read) do
24 sendrz(ackRead, read.sID)
25 on recv (stepdown) do
26 goto Candidate
27 passive forward
28 on recv (timeout) do
29 goto steppingDown
30 on recv (write) do
31 goto waitForReplicas
32 location steppingDown
33 on _ do
34 sendbr(stepdown)
35 goto Candidate
36 on recv (stepdown) do
37 goto Candidate
38 passive forward
39 location waitForReplicas
40 on _ do
41 sendbr(forward)
42 goto confirmToCleint
43 on recv (stepdown) do
44 goto Candidate
45 passive forward
46 location confirmToCleint
47 on _ do
48 sendrz(ackWrite, write.sID)
49 goto Leader
50 passive forward
Fig. 11. A description of an application using Chubby lock service.
the participants set is shown in Fig. 10b where the participants start in location Start and use
broadcast communications to identify each other and eventually obtain consistent sets in location
End.
Notice that such constructions of the sets ensures that the Consistent Participants precondition is
trivially met, and that our results (Theorem 4.4 and Lemma 4.7) extend to these cases. The proof of
the correctness of such extension follows from the nature of these structures. In both cases (1) the
processes moving from Start to End add each other to their participants sets, (2) once a process is
identified as a participants (i.e., in location Start) or as a non-participant (i.e., in location Rec) then
the processes reply uniformly about their intention to join (or not join) the instance of agreement,
and (3) the resulting participants sets are invariant to the order in which the replies are collected.
C EVALUATION BENCHMARKS
In this section, we provide specifications andMercury description for our benchmarks from Sec. 5.
QuickSilver can successfully verify all of our case studies.
Chubby Application
Protocol description. We evaluate a distributed lock service with a leader node, which has the
following behavior. All processes begin as candidates to be chosen as the leader. Upon performing
a Partition operation, one node is selected as the leader, while others are designated as replicas.
The leader fields requests from the environment and forwards them to the replicas. Once timeout
signal is received, the leader broadcasts to the system that it is stepping down, and all processes
become candidate leaders again.
Specifications. The safety properties for this system is that there is at most one leader at a time.
Distributed Smoke Detector
Protocol description. We consider a distributed smoke detector whose behavior is as follows. Upon
detecting smoke, the detectors coordinate using an agreement protocol to choose at most two
processes to contact the fire department.
Specifications. The safety properties for the Distributed Smoke Detector system, depicted in Fig. 12,
are: (1) at most two detectors can contact the fire department; and (2) detectors that did not detect
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1 process SmokeDetector
2 variables
3 idset participants
4 int[0, N] totalReps
5 actions
6 br Detected : unit
7 rz Rep : int[0, 1]
8 env
9 rz SmokeSignal : unit
10 br reset : unit
11 initial location WaitForSmoke
12 on recv(SmokeSignal) do
13 goto Ask
14 on recv(Detected) do
15 sendrz(Rep[0], Detected.sID)
16 goto Idle
17 location Ask
18 on _ do
19 sendbr(Detected)
20 participants.add(self)
21 goto Collect
22 on recv(Detected) reply Rep[1]
23 location Idle
24 on recv(Detected) reply Rep[0]
25 on recv(reset) do
26 participants = Empty
27 totalReps = 0
28 goto WaitForSmoke
29 passive pc1
30 location Collect
31 on recv(Rep) do
32 if (Rep.payld == 1)
33 participants.add(Rep.sID)
34 totalReps = totalReps + 1
35 if(totalReps == N-1)
36 goto Pick
37 on recv(Detected) reply Rep[1]
38 location Pick
39 on Partition<pc1>(participants,2)
40 win:
41 goto Report
42 lose:
43 goto Idle
44 on recv(Detected) reply Rep[1]
45 location Report
46 on recv(reset) do
47 participants = Empty
48 totalReps = 0
49 goto WaitForSmoke
Fig. 12. A smoke detector process.
fire will never report detecting one. With a reset signal, the verifier must make sure the the specifi-
cations are met for each round of the system: before the detectors go back to the detecting a new
fire, they must correctly handle the current one.
Distributed Mobile Robotics(DMRs)
Protocol description. As a larger case study, we model the system presented in [20] where a set
of robots share a workspace with obstacles, and need to coordinate their movements. The robots
coordinate to create a motion plan by successively choosing each robot to create a plan while
taking into account the previous robots’ plans. The robots choose one robot to make a plan, then
the remaining robots re-enter agreement to choose a second robot and so on. As in SATS, each
round of agreement determines the participant set of the next, but unlike SATS, the number of
agreement rounds is not statically bounded.
Specifications. The safety property here is that exactly one robot can be planning at a given time,
hence no collision will happen. We abstract away from the mechanics of creating the plan itself.
1 process DMR
2 variables
3 idset pcpts
4 int[0,N] totalReps
5 actions
6 br Coordinate : unit
7 br Done : unit
8 rz Rep : int[0,1]
9 env
10 rz TaskSignal : unit
11 initial location WaitForTasks
12 on recv(TaskSignal) do
13 goto Ask
14 on recv(Coordinate) do
15 sendrz(Rep[0], Coordinate.sID)
16 goto Idle
17 location Ask
18 on _ do
19 sendbr(Coordinate)
20 pcpts.add(self)
21 goto Collect
22 on recv(Coordinate) reply Rep[1]
23 location Idle
24 on recv(Coordinate) do
25 sendrz(Rep[0], Coordinate.sID)
26 passive Done, pc1
27 location Collect
28 on recv(Rep) do
29 if (Rep.payld == 1)
30 pcpts.add(Rep.sID)
31 totalReps = totalReps + 1
32 if(totalReps == N-1)
33 goto Pick
34 on recv(Coordinate) reply Rep[1]
35 location Pick
36 on Partition<pc1>(pcpts,1)
37 win:
38 goto Plan
39 lose:
40 goto Pause
41 on recv(Coordinate) reply Rep[1]
42 passive Done
43 location Pause
44 on recv(Done) do
45 pcpts.remove(Done.sID)
46 goto Pick
47 location Plan
48 on _ do
49 pcpts = Empty
50 sendbr(Done)
51 goto Execute
52 on recv(Done) do
53 pcpts = Empty
54 goto Execute
55 location Execute
56 passive pc1, Done
Fig. 13. A process description for a robot.
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